- Operation Date
- 20th August 1944
Planned early in 1944, Adder project had as its objective the Lautem Plateau area at the eastern tip of Portuguese Timor. Considerable enemy activity had been reported by search aircraft in this area, but the true nature of such activity was not apparent from aerial photographs.
The task allotted to Adder party was that of gathering intelligence on Japanese activity in the area, particularly road construction, air movements and aerodrome construction, and the extent to which the natives were co-operating with the enemy. The duration of the mission was to be one month.
The composition of the original party was : -
The first attempt at insertion was made on 20 May 44, by ML429 of the RAN, at a point on the south coast of Timor near Cape Lai Aco, 7 miles from the eastern tip of the island. In the course of ferrying party shores ashore, the landing craft was swamped and all equipment and stores were lost. The party therefore returned to LMS, Darwin. It is believed that the enemy discovered some of the stores lost on this occasion.
A second attempt to insert the party by ML was made in the middle of Jun 44, but while en route to the insertion point, the ML was spotted by enemy planes and the CSO of the RAN, Darwin ordered its return.
By the time the third attempt was ready to move, additional aerial photographs had been obtained, and the party leader decided that a different insertion point, in a small cove to the west of Cape Ile Hoi, 4 miles south-west of Cape Lai Aco. On this attempt, the party left Darwin aboard ML429 on 13 Aug 44, but while staging at Snake Bay, Melville Island, Sgt Shand injured his right hand, severely crushing the middle finger. In this condition, he was unfit to perform the duties of party signaller, and the party returned to Darwin to seek a replacement.
Sgt Gregg E.H. was obtained from the south to take the place of Shand, and the party finally sailed on 20 Aug, in ML429 with Lt Boas, RANVR, as extra navigator. ML429 was commanded by Lt Wadds, RANVR.
The insertion point was reached without mishap on the night of 21 Aug and the party was put ashore at about mid-night. After making a reconnaissance, while the ferrying of stores was in progress, the party leader informed the CO of the ML that while he was uncertain of his exact whereabouts, he was satisfied that he was practically at his objective. All stores were ferried ashore without loss, and the ML returned to Darwin.
Although signal traffic with the party was not expected to be great, no signals whatever were received after its insertion. Beaufort aircraft on the daily sweep in that area were diverted to search for Adder on 5, 6 and 7 Sep and on a number of subsequent occasions, but no sign of the party was seen. On 11 Sep, Cobra party was told of the insertion of Adder and was requested to investigate. At this time, Cobra was in Japanese hands, a fact which had already been suspected. Cobra replied on 5 Oct that their native had been unable to penetrate to the Adder area by reason of Japanese patrols.
Towards the end of the rather vague period of 'one moth' prescribed in the Operation Instruction of Adder as the duration of its mission, arrangements were made with RAN, Darwin for a sortie by ML's to the insertion point, in the hope of contacting the party and effecting its extraction. On the night of 19 Sep 44, two ML's patrolled off the coast in the vicinity of Cap Ile Hoi. As they cruised slowly from east to west past the insertion point, a number of large fires flared up suddenly on the shore as the vessels came abreast of their positions. A number of other smaller fires were also seen it the vicinity. Other than these fires, no signals whatever were seen from the shore. The ML's therefore returned to Darwin. Following the unsuccessful sortie, it was learned that the cove which constituted Adder's insertion point had been adopted by the enemy as a barge staging point.
Information received in Oct 45, disclosed that Adder party was captured within a few hours of landing in Timor. One native was believed to have been killed. Capt Grimson and Sgt Gregg were believed to have been wounded when captured and both subsequently died of their wounds and/or disease while prisoners. The other native who had survived the capture also died while prisoners.
According to the accounts of the Japanese prisoners interrogated in Timor after the surrender, Grimson and Gregg were both killed by the Japanese in a skirmish on the morning following entry. Rebele is believed to have died as the result of falling from a cliff, and the other two from malnutrition and disease while prisoners of the Japanese.
The extent to which the signals sent to Cobra and Lagarte regarding the intention to insert Adder, contributed to its capture, cannot definitely by ascertained. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the disclosures were the primary cause of Adder's capture.
The operational planning of Adder was poorly conceived in that no details had been worked out to cover the emergency of wireless failure. The exact duration of the mission was not prescribed, and no recognition signals for the evacuation had been arranged. As a result of the failure of the plan to provide for such emergencies, F/Lt Brierley, Intelligence and Liaison Officer in Darwin submitted to Melbourne headquarters certain proposals for a standard emergency procedure and signal code for all parties subsequently put into the field. These proposals were subsequently adopted and became standard Emergency Procedure Plan.
PERSONNEL:
CAPTAIN John Edward Grimson NGX 10
born 19th July 1908, Armidale, New South Wales
19th January 1940 entered service Rabaul, New Guinea
KIA 22nd August 1944
Ambon War Cemetery, Indonesia. 19.D.11
SERGEANT Ernest Harry GREGG NX 7435
born 20th August 1915, Manchester, England
7th November 1939 entered service Paddington, New South Wales
KIA 22nd August 1944
Ambon War Cemetery, Indonesia. 19.D.10
Source : The Official History of the Operations and Administration of] Special Operations - Australia [(SOA), also known as the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) and Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD)] Volume 2 - Operations - copy no 4 [for Director, Military Intelligence (DMI), Headquarters (HQ), Australian Military Forces (AMF), Melbourne - abridged version of copy no 1
The task allotted to Adder party was that of gathering intelligence on Japanese activity in the area, particularly road construction, air movements and aerodrome construction, and the extent to which the natives were co-operating with the enemy. The duration of the mission was to be one month.
The composition of the original party was : -
Capt. J. Grimson (AIF) (Leader)
Sgt J. Shand (AIF) (Sig)
A. Fernandez
Z. Rebelo
J. Carvalho.
When, on the third attempt at insertion, Sgt Shand suffered an injury to his hand, Sgt Gregg E.H. (AIF) was substituted as the party Signaller.The first attempt at insertion was made on 20 May 44, by ML429 of the RAN, at a point on the south coast of Timor near Cape Lai Aco, 7 miles from the eastern tip of the island. In the course of ferrying party shores ashore, the landing craft was swamped and all equipment and stores were lost. The party therefore returned to LMS, Darwin. It is believed that the enemy discovered some of the stores lost on this occasion.
A second attempt to insert the party by ML was made in the middle of Jun 44, but while en route to the insertion point, the ML was spotted by enemy planes and the CSO of the RAN, Darwin ordered its return.
By the time the third attempt was ready to move, additional aerial photographs had been obtained, and the party leader decided that a different insertion point, in a small cove to the west of Cape Ile Hoi, 4 miles south-west of Cape Lai Aco. On this attempt, the party left Darwin aboard ML429 on 13 Aug 44, but while staging at Snake Bay, Melville Island, Sgt Shand injured his right hand, severely crushing the middle finger. In this condition, he was unfit to perform the duties of party signaller, and the party returned to Darwin to seek a replacement.
Sgt Gregg E.H. was obtained from the south to take the place of Shand, and the party finally sailed on 20 Aug, in ML429 with Lt Boas, RANVR, as extra navigator. ML429 was commanded by Lt Wadds, RANVR.
The insertion point was reached without mishap on the night of 21 Aug and the party was put ashore at about mid-night. After making a reconnaissance, while the ferrying of stores was in progress, the party leader informed the CO of the ML that while he was uncertain of his exact whereabouts, he was satisfied that he was practically at his objective. All stores were ferried ashore without loss, and the ML returned to Darwin.
Although signal traffic with the party was not expected to be great, no signals whatever were received after its insertion. Beaufort aircraft on the daily sweep in that area were diverted to search for Adder on 5, 6 and 7 Sep and on a number of subsequent occasions, but no sign of the party was seen. On 11 Sep, Cobra party was told of the insertion of Adder and was requested to investigate. At this time, Cobra was in Japanese hands, a fact which had already been suspected. Cobra replied on 5 Oct that their native had been unable to penetrate to the Adder area by reason of Japanese patrols.
Towards the end of the rather vague period of 'one moth' prescribed in the Operation Instruction of Adder as the duration of its mission, arrangements were made with RAN, Darwin for a sortie by ML's to the insertion point, in the hope of contacting the party and effecting its extraction. On the night of 19 Sep 44, two ML's patrolled off the coast in the vicinity of Cap Ile Hoi. As they cruised slowly from east to west past the insertion point, a number of large fires flared up suddenly on the shore as the vessels came abreast of their positions. A number of other smaller fires were also seen it the vicinity. Other than these fires, no signals whatever were seen from the shore. The ML's therefore returned to Darwin. Following the unsuccessful sortie, it was learned that the cove which constituted Adder's insertion point had been adopted by the enemy as a barge staging point.
Information received in Oct 45, disclosed that Adder party was captured within a few hours of landing in Timor. One native was believed to have been killed. Capt Grimson and Sgt Gregg were believed to have been wounded when captured and both subsequently died of their wounds and/or disease while prisoners. The other native who had survived the capture also died while prisoners.
According to the accounts of the Japanese prisoners interrogated in Timor after the surrender, Grimson and Gregg were both killed by the Japanese in a skirmish on the morning following entry. Rebele is believed to have died as the result of falling from a cliff, and the other two from malnutrition and disease while prisoners of the Japanese.
The extent to which the signals sent to Cobra and Lagarte regarding the intention to insert Adder, contributed to its capture, cannot definitely by ascertained. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the disclosures were the primary cause of Adder's capture.
The operational planning of Adder was poorly conceived in that no details had been worked out to cover the emergency of wireless failure. The exact duration of the mission was not prescribed, and no recognition signals for the evacuation had been arranged. As a result of the failure of the plan to provide for such emergencies, F/Lt Brierley, Intelligence and Liaison Officer in Darwin submitted to Melbourne headquarters certain proposals for a standard emergency procedure and signal code for all parties subsequently put into the field. These proposals were subsequently adopted and became standard Emergency Procedure Plan.
PERSONNEL:
CAPTAIN John Edward Grimson NGX 10
born 19th July 1908, Armidale, New South Wales
19th January 1940 entered service Rabaul, New Guinea
KIA 22nd August 1944
Ambon War Cemetery, Indonesia. 19.D.11
SERGEANT Ernest Harry GREGG NX 7435
born 20th August 1915, Manchester, England
7th November 1939 entered service Paddington, New South Wales
KIA 22nd August 1944
Ambon War Cemetery, Indonesia. 19.D.10
Source : The Official History of the Operations and Administration of] Special Operations - Australia [(SOA), also known as the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) and Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD)] Volume 2 - Operations - copy no 4 [for Director, Military Intelligence (DMI), Headquarters (HQ), Australian Military Forces (AMF), Melbourne - abridged version of copy no 1