- Operation Date
- 24th March 1945
CONTENTS
- "A" COY 1 CDN PARA BN - NARRATIVE OF FIRST TWO DAYS OF PRESENT OPERATION
- "B" COY NARRATIVE ON "D", "D1"
- "C" COY NARRATIVE, D Day & D 1 (Mar 24 & 25, 1945)
- VICKERS PLATOON D AND D PLUS ONE
- MORTAR PLATOON
- PIAT PLATOON
- Experiences of Capt (now Major) J.A. CLANCY, POW from 24 MAR 45 until he escaped 15 APR 45, and reached Allied lines 18 APR 45.
"A" Coy
"A" COY 1 CDN PARA BN
NARRATIVE OF FIRST TWO DAYS OF PRESENT OPERATION
All sticks of this Coy landed on the DZ with very few exceptions who landed in the very near vicinity in all cases to the EAST of the DZ.
The Coy formed up in the RV which was unoccupied; the first person arriving being Lt G.A. Meen, O.C. No. 2 P1. Approx 30 minutes after the drop we were organized in our RV, our strength being about 70% of normal and we set out for our objective. We encountered seven enemy soldiers on our route to the objective but they were dealt with immediately and did not hold us up at all. Our pace was a fast walk.
We carried on through our objective encountering practically no enemy resistance. About forty prisoners were collected. At this time a pl from B Coy were in the NORTHERN end of this objective. We reported our objective cleared at about 1130 hrs, 1.e. an hour and a half after the drop and took up our coy position, the SOUTHERN end of the village. During this time the remainder of our Coy were reporting in. On a final count we found we had lost 13 in casualties.
There was little or no enemy activity until approx 1430 hrs when about seventy five enemy troops advanced toward our position from the WEST. When they came close enough to be identified we opened fire took sixty four prisoners and left numerous dead and wounded on the field.
About 1530 hrs we sent a patrol of twelve approx to the next village WEST of our position. We used six prisoners as a shield, the village proved to be empty, but we were engaged by mortar from the woods on our left. This force was about ten in strength and we eliminated them with bren fire.
At 1800 hrs a standing patrol, 1 pl strong was sent to area of tooth shaped wood on SOUTHERN edge of the DZ. This patrol remained there until 0600 hrs, 25 MAR 45 when they were relieved by another pl. During the night, there was some mortaring and 20 mm fire on this patrol - four prisoners were captured,
Also at about 1400 hrs, 24 MAR 45 a fighting patrol was sent through the woods NORTH of our area to locate an SP gun reputed to be firing at the 8th Bn. The gun was not located but a German patrol was encountered. We killed 1 enemy, captured one and had no casualties ourselves. This patrol returned approximately 1700 hrs.
On the following day, D 1, 25 MAR 45 a patrol was sent from the standing patrol in the tooth shaped wood across the DZ to check on a group of buildings. Several Germans were killed, we had no casualties.
On the same day D 1 another patrol was sent out from the tooth shaped wood to check a route to the NORTH EAST to be used by the 15th Div. The area was found to be clear of enemy.
(R.E. HARRISON) CAPT,
A COY, 1 CDN PARA BN.
NARRATIVE OF FIRST TWO DAYS OF PRESENT OPERATION
All sticks of this Coy landed on the DZ with very few exceptions who landed in the very near vicinity in all cases to the EAST of the DZ.
The Coy formed up in the RV which was unoccupied; the first person arriving being Lt G.A. Meen, O.C. No. 2 P1. Approx 30 minutes after the drop we were organized in our RV, our strength being about 70% of normal and we set out for our objective. We encountered seven enemy soldiers on our route to the objective but they were dealt with immediately and did not hold us up at all. Our pace was a fast walk.
We carried on through our objective encountering practically no enemy resistance. About forty prisoners were collected. At this time a pl from B Coy were in the NORTHERN end of this objective. We reported our objective cleared at about 1130 hrs, 1.e. an hour and a half after the drop and took up our coy position, the SOUTHERN end of the village. During this time the remainder of our Coy were reporting in. On a final count we found we had lost 13 in casualties.
There was little or no enemy activity until approx 1430 hrs when about seventy five enemy troops advanced toward our position from the WEST. When they came close enough to be identified we opened fire took sixty four prisoners and left numerous dead and wounded on the field.
About 1530 hrs we sent a patrol of twelve approx to the next village WEST of our position. We used six prisoners as a shield, the village proved to be empty, but we were engaged by mortar from the woods on our left. This force was about ten in strength and we eliminated them with bren fire.
At 1800 hrs a standing patrol, 1 pl strong was sent to area of tooth shaped wood on SOUTHERN edge of the DZ. This patrol remained there until 0600 hrs, 25 MAR 45 when they were relieved by another pl. During the night, there was some mortaring and 20 mm fire on this patrol - four prisoners were captured,
Also at about 1400 hrs, 24 MAR 45 a fighting patrol was sent through the woods NORTH of our area to locate an SP gun reputed to be firing at the 8th Bn. The gun was not located but a German patrol was encountered. We killed 1 enemy, captured one and had no casualties ourselves. This patrol returned approximately 1700 hrs.
On the following day, D 1, 25 MAR 45 a patrol was sent from the standing patrol in the tooth shaped wood across the DZ to check on a group of buildings. Several Germans were killed, we had no casualties.
On the same day D 1 another patrol was sent out from the tooth shaped wood to check a route to the NORTH EAST to be used by the 15th Div. The area was found to be clear of enemy.
(R.E. HARRISON) CAPT,
A COY, 1 CDN PARA BN.
"B" COY NARRATIVE ON "D", "D1"
"B" COY NARRATIVE ON "D", "D1" 12 APR 45
We took off at approx 0730 hrs, 24 MAR 45. It was a beautiful day and had all promises of being just as good a jump.
Everyone was in good spirit, excepting Major C.E. Fuller, whom we left at the airfield after waving us all good-bye.
The trip was a 2½ hour plane ride which was uneventful excepting the odd container being jettisoned and altogether a grant experience.
We arrived over the DZ at approx 1000 hrs, 5 minutes early, and all sticks were good.
We only had one who didn't jump. - Pte. Church, L.G.
The DZ was one made halocaust!! Everyone running in all directions, but finally following the NCO's and Officers to the RV.
Plenty hot on the DZ., and quite a number in the coy failed to get to the RV:
Here they Are:
Lt J.J. Brunete
Lt J.L. Davies (cas)
Pte.Coulson, J.
Pte. Nickerson, R.A.
Pte. Dodge, F.E.
Pte. McCarthy, A. (Cas)
Pte. Cahute, N. (Cas)
Pte. McLaughlin
Cpl Veinot P.E. (Cas)
Pte. Carlton, R.H.
Pte. Marsden, L.A.
Pte. Robertson, D.K.
Pte. Elden, A.L.
Cpl. Flynn, C.D.
The Coy formed up in the RV with the usual confusion which is attached to a reorganization. Capt S.W. McGowan--OC had not shown up.
On the Brigadier's order, the Coy was moved to right about 200 yds, and proceeded to dig in.
Capt McGowan showed up, a large hole in his helmet and a slight wound, - and #4 pl proceeded to Bn objective. #5 and #6 Pls did not move off till Capt McGowan went back further, which put #4 P1 about 500 yds in front.
Coy moved through woods in orderly fashion, and each platoon went through with their individual tasks. #4 pl had assaulted and were consolidating when 5 & 6 got to the objective. #5 pl proceeded to cross rds and consolidated. #6 pl mopped up objective and consolidated cross rds. Coy HQ set up on objective.
Sgt Paige captured 98 prisoners with 6 men.
#4 pl shot up a column of Germans on rd and bridge. #5 pl sent out to cover track junc to coy's left about 1000 yds through wood. #6 pl moved over to ground formerly occupied by #5.
Everything looked rosy except the ration situation.
Cpl Flynn, 4 P1 was wounded while clearing out some woods. Pte. McPherson, who was formerly missing turned up with a huge bandage and a wicked wound. Ptes Campbell and Cameron also turned up. Coy spent night cold as is 25 Mar 45.
Pte. Kivinen later turned up on D5.
Day uneventful, with #4 pl relieving #5 in woods. All quiet till approx 2200 hrs where we had some mortars and shells in Coy area.
V.E. FLEMING LT
2IC "B" Coy,
1 Cdn Para Bn.
We took off at approx 0730 hrs, 24 MAR 45. It was a beautiful day and had all promises of being just as good a jump.
Everyone was in good spirit, excepting Major C.E. Fuller, whom we left at the airfield after waving us all good-bye.
The trip was a 2½ hour plane ride which was uneventful excepting the odd container being jettisoned and altogether a grant experience.
We arrived over the DZ at approx 1000 hrs, 5 minutes early, and all sticks were good.
We only had one who didn't jump. - Pte. Church, L.G.
The DZ was one made halocaust!! Everyone running in all directions, but finally following the NCO's and Officers to the RV.
Plenty hot on the DZ., and quite a number in the coy failed to get to the RV:
Here they Are:
Lt J.J. Brunete
Lt J.L. Davies (cas)
Pte.Coulson, J.
Pte. Nickerson, R.A.
Pte. Dodge, F.E.
Pte. McCarthy, A. (Cas)
Pte. Cahute, N. (Cas)
Pte. McLaughlin
Cpl Veinot P.E. (Cas)
Pte. Carlton, R.H.
Pte. Marsden, L.A.
Pte. Robertson, D.K.
Pte. Elden, A.L.
Cpl. Flynn, C.D.
The Coy formed up in the RV with the usual confusion which is attached to a reorganization. Capt S.W. McGowan--OC had not shown up.
On the Brigadier's order, the Coy was moved to right about 200 yds, and proceeded to dig in.
Capt McGowan showed up, a large hole in his helmet and a slight wound, - and #4 pl proceeded to Bn objective. #5 and #6 Pls did not move off till Capt McGowan went back further, which put #4 P1 about 500 yds in front.
Coy moved through woods in orderly fashion, and each platoon went through with their individual tasks. #4 pl had assaulted and were consolidating when 5 & 6 got to the objective. #5 pl proceeded to cross rds and consolidated. #6 pl mopped up objective and consolidated cross rds. Coy HQ set up on objective.
Sgt Paige captured 98 prisoners with 6 men.
#4 pl shot up a column of Germans on rd and bridge. #5 pl sent out to cover track junc to coy's left about 1000 yds through wood. #6 pl moved over to ground formerly occupied by #5.
Everything looked rosy except the ration situation.
Cpl Flynn, 4 P1 was wounded while clearing out some woods. Pte. McPherson, who was formerly missing turned up with a huge bandage and a wicked wound. Ptes Campbell and Cameron also turned up. Coy spent night cold as is 25 Mar 45.
Pte. Kivinen later turned up on D5.
Day uneventful, with #4 pl relieving #5 in woods. All quiet till approx 2200 hrs where we had some mortars and shells in Coy area.
V.E. FLEMING LT
2IC "B" Coy,
1 Cdn Para Bn.
"C" COY NARRATIVE, D Day & D 1 (Mar 24 & 25, 1945)
The task of "C" Coy on our operation of the 24th was to secure two objective as quickly as possible an to enable the remainder of the Bn to gain their objectives. We were the first sub unit of our Bn to parachute into Germany.
We crossed the Rhine at approx 0956 hrs. About 4 minutes later or thereabouts the number ones of the leading Vics jumped.
There was quite a bit of confusion on the DZ. There was still quite a bit of small arms fire being aimed at us. Now that I have you on the ground I would like to define our objectives more clearly. Nos 7 & 8 pls had as their objective "The line of the woods running EAST and WEST along the edge of the DZ. This job was given to #7 pl. #8 pl had as its objective "The road which ran NORTH and SOUTH along the forward edge of the wood. #9 pl had to take the buildings at a T-rd junc MR 154479. The MR for the objective of the two platoons in 156477.
Our plan was to take our objectives as quickly as possible using all the weapons we had. The Coy got off of the DZ quite quickly and our objectives were taken within a half an hour from the time we landed.
Incidents that should be mentioned are these because they have a bearing on what follows: Our Major had a fractured collar bone. Our 2IC Capt Clancy was missing. Men who did outstanding jobs were Sgt Bray, Pte. Desalliers, & Pte. Bithrey.
After consolidating our positions the enemy started to shell and mortar us. He did this all through the night. In the afternoon a carrier tried to come through our position. The enemy dropped a lucky one right on it. It sure was a hot spot for a while.
About 1700 hrs I received word to take over the Coy because the Major was being evacuated. This I did and tried to carry the Coy through.
The gliders of the Bde had dropped also on our DZ. During the afternoon and evening we sent patrols to try and unload them. Some of the parties succeeded and others could not reach them. During the night we established a patrol EAST of #7 pl's position where a hedge ran out to the small woods on the DZ. The enemy by this time had been retiring from the Rhine and we had seen approx 200 of them go into a wood 800 yds NW of #9 Pl's position. Also in the night he moved up some 20 mm guns and fired at the gliders. Two of them he set on fire.
This is where Capt Boss came into action. He was the F.O.O. that was attached to us. He had the arty. lay down a concentration on this posn.
During the night the enemy kept up his shelling and mortaring. At approx 0530 hrs of the 25th he attacked out position at the T-rd junction. His attack was not a success. We suffered a few casualties. We had foreseen a possible attack from that position and had taken the necessary measures to counteract it. We had in that position 2 sections of Vickers, 1 det of Mortars, 9 bren guns and 27 stens; also 3 PIATS.
In the other pl areas 1 sec per pl was ready as a counter attack force. They were used but just to strengthen the other pl's positions. One of the mortar crews cooperating with the PIATS knocked out an 88 mm SP gun. The attack beaten off, things quieted down for a while. The enemy still continued to shell our position. During the shelling of the afternoon, Capt Boss was wounded and evacuated.
At about 1500 hrs, 25th I received word that contact had been made with the 15th Highland Division.
They came through our positions and proceeded NORTH along the main rd.
That night things were quiet and we left our little area and made contact with the American 17th Airborne and started on our way to BERLIN.
We crossed the Rhine at approx 0956 hrs. About 4 minutes later or thereabouts the number ones of the leading Vics jumped.
There was quite a bit of confusion on the DZ. There was still quite a bit of small arms fire being aimed at us. Now that I have you on the ground I would like to define our objectives more clearly. Nos 7 & 8 pls had as their objective "The line of the woods running EAST and WEST along the edge of the DZ. This job was given to #7 pl. #8 pl had as its objective "The road which ran NORTH and SOUTH along the forward edge of the wood. #9 pl had to take the buildings at a T-rd junc MR 154479. The MR for the objective of the two platoons in 156477.
Our plan was to take our objectives as quickly as possible using all the weapons we had. The Coy got off of the DZ quite quickly and our objectives were taken within a half an hour from the time we landed.
Incidents that should be mentioned are these because they have a bearing on what follows: Our Major had a fractured collar bone. Our 2IC Capt Clancy was missing. Men who did outstanding jobs were Sgt Bray, Pte. Desalliers, & Pte. Bithrey.
After consolidating our positions the enemy started to shell and mortar us. He did this all through the night. In the afternoon a carrier tried to come through our position. The enemy dropped a lucky one right on it. It sure was a hot spot for a while.
About 1700 hrs I received word to take over the Coy because the Major was being evacuated. This I did and tried to carry the Coy through.
The gliders of the Bde had dropped also on our DZ. During the afternoon and evening we sent patrols to try and unload them. Some of the parties succeeded and others could not reach them. During the night we established a patrol EAST of #7 pl's position where a hedge ran out to the small woods on the DZ. The enemy by this time had been retiring from the Rhine and we had seen approx 200 of them go into a wood 800 yds NW of #9 Pl's position. Also in the night he moved up some 20 mm guns and fired at the gliders. Two of them he set on fire.
This is where Capt Boss came into action. He was the F.O.O. that was attached to us. He had the arty. lay down a concentration on this posn.
During the night the enemy kept up his shelling and mortaring. At approx 0530 hrs of the 25th he attacked out position at the T-rd junction. His attack was not a success. We suffered a few casualties. We had foreseen a possible attack from that position and had taken the necessary measures to counteract it. We had in that position 2 sections of Vickers, 1 det of Mortars, 9 bren guns and 27 stens; also 3 PIATS.
In the other pl areas 1 sec per pl was ready as a counter attack force. They were used but just to strengthen the other pl's positions. One of the mortar crews cooperating with the PIATS knocked out an 88 mm SP gun. The attack beaten off, things quieted down for a while. The enemy still continued to shell our position. During the shelling of the afternoon, Capt Boss was wounded and evacuated.
At about 1500 hrs, 25th I received word that contact had been made with the 15th Highland Division.
They came through our positions and proceeded NORTH along the main rd.
That night things were quiet and we left our little area and made contact with the American 17th Airborne and started on our way to BERLIN.
VICKERS PLATOON D AND D PLUS ONE
The drop of the Vickers platoon, one officer and forty ORs, carried in four aircraft, was at approx 1000 hrs, and according to plan. All equipment, including four MMGs was carried in forty-one kit bags on the drop. Except for one man killed and one man wounded on the SZ most of the platoon arrived at the RV and secured the objective at about 1020 hrs. The objective was a small copse of the right side of the road with farm buildings on the left side.
On the platoon front there were several houses and barns from three to five hundred yards away. All during the day twenty fourth March there was considerable activity by snipers, one man (Pte. C.H. Clark) was killed during the afternoon while assisting in the rescue of the crew from a glider which landed between the platoon position and the enemy. In all, three gliders came under heavy small arms fire from these buildings and a Cpl (Cpl Chambers, J.L.) displayed great courage and skill in personally organizing and leading the rescue party which was successful in covering the withdrawal of the glider crews and dragging or carrying the pilots of all three gliders, who were seriously wounded.
During the afternoon about a company of the enemy were observed approaching from the river, they stopped for a rest while still at about one thousand yards distance. They gathered in groups and the section of mortars which was with the platoon was directed to engage them, most were observed to disperse at the double in all directions. Later in the day the remainder of this group of enemy arrived on the front of A Coy and all were killed or captured.
All during the day the mortars rendered invaluable assistance and the fire controllers, Cpl Tolmie and Cpl Creelman, did a very excellent job of engaging targets which appeared and are too numerous to recall. They always came forward and directed fire from the best position of observation even when this entailed drawing small arms fire. At all times they were at the call of the vickers platoon commander and always displayed skill in their work and had no concern for their own safety.
Early in the night the enemy made attempts to infiltrate and several managed to get within fifty yards before they were disposed of by snipers or a burst from a vickers. We had little knowledge of what was happening in the rest of the detailed area, but considered our own position, for the first night in Germany to be very good, the platoon was well dug in on a fifty yard front astride the road and in close contact with 9 Platoon of C Coy. Supply of amn was very adequate, containers with MMG amn had been dropped on our objective. At dusk the loads from the gliders, which included food and amn, was salvaged. Visibility all night was very good and there was sufficient activity to keep all ranks awake and interested.
Just before first light an SP arrived in the vicinity of the house opposite, and began firing from close range (about four hundred yards). Another armoured vehicle joined the SP and fire became quite heavy. At this point it became very difficult to keep the enemy under observation and Cpl Tolmie of the mortars rendered very valuable assistance by exposing himself all during the fire in order to get observation on the flanks as well as the front. A man who had exposed himself at one of the front gun pits (two guns on the platoon front and one on either flank) was killed instantly and Cpl Chambers firing one of the MMG was wounded in the shoulder and unable to operate the gun efficiently as movement with one arm was impossible. He was given permission to leave his gun but refused to do so until ordered to move to the FAP. The FAP however was the house across the road and had been set ablaze by the SP so he returned and remained with the platoon until the action was over. The SP was firing at each gun in turn and also at the mortars which were on low ground to the rear of the platoon area. The enemy were observed forming up in the vicinity of the buildings and the adjoining orchard. They presented an excellent target so were engaged with four MMG and dispersed with casualties they pulled back in to the cover of the buildings and apparently effected some sort of reorganization, they began to advance again, in line, and were allowed to approach until well forward of the buildings on open ground. They were engaged by MMGs and rifles. The mortars had been engaging the SP gun and had scored two direct hits., this knocked the gun out or at least caused both to withdraw.
The infantry began to run back to the area of the buildings, twenty were left killed. The enemy stretcher bearers carried many of the wounded away and later in the day when the buildings were cleared out, ten were passed back to the RAP.
Near the end of this attack artillery support had been obtained and all the buildings of the area occupied by the enemy were heavily shelled and set on fire.
During the last phase of the action reinforcements, including PIATS had been received from C Coy. The PIATS were very successful in discouraging the enemy from remaining in the buildings. Sgt. Fairborn was very active and enthusiastic in directing a PIAT shoot, which cleared the houses of all the enemy but the wounded.
A message was received during the night that the fifteenth Scottish and tanks would arrive at first light, this was passed on with good effect on moral, and the Scottish were welcomed about 1500 hrs on D plus one.
Shortly after the attack was repulsed a Messerschmidt was shot down and crashed near by, and the pilot parachuted into the platoon area. This incident created an interesting diversion and was considered a fitting climax to the events of the first night in Germany.
Enemy shelling occupied the platoon for most of the day on D plus one, however the only casualty was the compo ration which unfortunately suffered a direct hit.
At the end of D plus one, the platoon had excellent moral and casualties (three killed, two wounded, and three slightly wounded who remained with the platoon) were considered very light.
Vickers Pl. Comd.
On the platoon front there were several houses and barns from three to five hundred yards away. All during the day twenty fourth March there was considerable activity by snipers, one man (Pte. C.H. Clark) was killed during the afternoon while assisting in the rescue of the crew from a glider which landed between the platoon position and the enemy. In all, three gliders came under heavy small arms fire from these buildings and a Cpl (Cpl Chambers, J.L.) displayed great courage and skill in personally organizing and leading the rescue party which was successful in covering the withdrawal of the glider crews and dragging or carrying the pilots of all three gliders, who were seriously wounded.
During the afternoon about a company of the enemy were observed approaching from the river, they stopped for a rest while still at about one thousand yards distance. They gathered in groups and the section of mortars which was with the platoon was directed to engage them, most were observed to disperse at the double in all directions. Later in the day the remainder of this group of enemy arrived on the front of A Coy and all were killed or captured.
All during the day the mortars rendered invaluable assistance and the fire controllers, Cpl Tolmie and Cpl Creelman, did a very excellent job of engaging targets which appeared and are too numerous to recall. They always came forward and directed fire from the best position of observation even when this entailed drawing small arms fire. At all times they were at the call of the vickers platoon commander and always displayed skill in their work and had no concern for their own safety.
Early in the night the enemy made attempts to infiltrate and several managed to get within fifty yards before they were disposed of by snipers or a burst from a vickers. We had little knowledge of what was happening in the rest of the detailed area, but considered our own position, for the first night in Germany to be very good, the platoon was well dug in on a fifty yard front astride the road and in close contact with 9 Platoon of C Coy. Supply of amn was very adequate, containers with MMG amn had been dropped on our objective. At dusk the loads from the gliders, which included food and amn, was salvaged. Visibility all night was very good and there was sufficient activity to keep all ranks awake and interested.
Just before first light an SP arrived in the vicinity of the house opposite, and began firing from close range (about four hundred yards). Another armoured vehicle joined the SP and fire became quite heavy. At this point it became very difficult to keep the enemy under observation and Cpl Tolmie of the mortars rendered very valuable assistance by exposing himself all during the fire in order to get observation on the flanks as well as the front. A man who had exposed himself at one of the front gun pits (two guns on the platoon front and one on either flank) was killed instantly and Cpl Chambers firing one of the MMG was wounded in the shoulder and unable to operate the gun efficiently as movement with one arm was impossible. He was given permission to leave his gun but refused to do so until ordered to move to the FAP. The FAP however was the house across the road and had been set ablaze by the SP so he returned and remained with the platoon until the action was over. The SP was firing at each gun in turn and also at the mortars which were on low ground to the rear of the platoon area. The enemy were observed forming up in the vicinity of the buildings and the adjoining orchard. They presented an excellent target so were engaged with four MMG and dispersed with casualties they pulled back in to the cover of the buildings and apparently effected some sort of reorganization, they began to advance again, in line, and were allowed to approach until well forward of the buildings on open ground. They were engaged by MMGs and rifles. The mortars had been engaging the SP gun and had scored two direct hits., this knocked the gun out or at least caused both to withdraw.
The infantry began to run back to the area of the buildings, twenty were left killed. The enemy stretcher bearers carried many of the wounded away and later in the day when the buildings were cleared out, ten were passed back to the RAP.
Near the end of this attack artillery support had been obtained and all the buildings of the area occupied by the enemy were heavily shelled and set on fire.
During the last phase of the action reinforcements, including PIATS had been received from C Coy. The PIATS were very successful in discouraging the enemy from remaining in the buildings. Sgt. Fairborn was very active and enthusiastic in directing a PIAT shoot, which cleared the houses of all the enemy but the wounded.
A message was received during the night that the fifteenth Scottish and tanks would arrive at first light, this was passed on with good effect on moral, and the Scottish were welcomed about 1500 hrs on D plus one.
Shortly after the attack was repulsed a Messerschmidt was shot down and crashed near by, and the pilot parachuted into the platoon area. This incident created an interesting diversion and was considered a fitting climax to the events of the first night in Germany.
Enemy shelling occupied the platoon for most of the day on D plus one, however the only casualty was the compo ration which unfortunately suffered a direct hit.
At the end of D plus one, the platoon had excellent moral and casualties (three killed, two wounded, and three slightly wounded who remained with the platoon) were considered very light.
Vickers Pl. Comd.
MORTAR PLATOON
The Mortar pl was emplaned in 4 planes, nos 60 to 72. Sgt Halsa was stick comd on plane 69, Sgt Glow on plane 70, Sgt Barr on plane 71, and Lt Lynch on Plane 72.
All detachments landed on the DZ, but last men from sticks had to land in the woods, NORTH of the DZ.
The first detachment to reach their RV (C Coy) was No 2 detachment, comd by Sgt Glow, who started to engage a target EAST of C Coy area. No 3 detachment under Sgt Barr with a number of men from No 1 and 4 detachments joined them. I was delayed on the DZ with 3 of my men.
On my arrival at our RV we recognized the platoon, By that time Sgt Fitzsimmons came in with his Bren Carrier. Under orders from Major Hilborn, one section was to stay with C Coy and the other section take positions at Bn RV. Our casualties then were 1 Sgt, 1 Cpl and 4 Ptes.
As we started to move to Bn RV our Bren carrier received a direct hit and started to burn, causing 3 more casualties.
The section attached to C Coy had different tasks during their stay, one of which was to stop an SP gun by a direct hit. No 2 section at Bn RV took positions near a cemetery, and was placed under comd of the Commanding Officer. We had different tasks, most of them to support "C" Coy.
Our total casualties were 5 killed and 5 wounded.
G. Lynch Lt
Mortar Pl Commander
All detachments landed on the DZ, but last men from sticks had to land in the woods, NORTH of the DZ.
The first detachment to reach their RV (C Coy) was No 2 detachment, comd by Sgt Glow, who started to engage a target EAST of C Coy area. No 3 detachment under Sgt Barr with a number of men from No 1 and 4 detachments joined them. I was delayed on the DZ with 3 of my men.
On my arrival at our RV we recognized the platoon, By that time Sgt Fitzsimmons came in with his Bren Carrier. Under orders from Major Hilborn, one section was to stay with C Coy and the other section take positions at Bn RV. Our casualties then were 1 Sgt, 1 Cpl and 4 Ptes.
As we started to move to Bn RV our Bren carrier received a direct hit and started to burn, causing 3 more casualties.
The section attached to C Coy had different tasks during their stay, one of which was to stop an SP gun by a direct hit. No 2 section at Bn RV took positions near a cemetery, and was placed under comd of the Commanding Officer. We had different tasks, most of them to support "C" Coy.
Our total casualties were 5 killed and 5 wounded.
G. Lynch Lt
Mortar Pl Commander
PIAT PLATOON
The PIAT pl, for the R day operation, was broken down and distributed to Rifle Coys and platoons. We had four guns in each rifle coy, one with each platoon and one with Coy HQ. Sgt R Wyrostok did a grand job of equipping the platoon and we had everything that we needed.
L/Sgt D. Fairborn took over #1 Sec and was attached to C Coy. Cpl A Pearson commanded #2 Sec with "B" Coy and L/Sgt C. Crouse had our #3 sec with "A" Coy. L/Sgt H Holloway and our #4 AA Sec went as a protection sec for Bn HQ. All the detachment jumped with the platoon to which they were attached and on hitting the deck immediately went to their various RVs.
#1 Sec under L/Sgt Fairborn had their most active time when the enemy put in a counter-attack in "C" Coy at 0430 hrs, 25 MAR. L/Sgt Fairborn took over his four PIATS and opened up at high-angle fire. They knocked out one SP gun and were responsible for the hasty withdrawal of the remainder. In this way #1 sec assisted C Coy in repelling the counter- attack and were able to take over the enemy positions.
#2 Section was gathered together on the RV by Cpl A Pearson. They accompanied B Coy to their objective. On the way they ran into an SP gun and machine gun fire. Cpl Pearson immediately went out with Pte. K. Burr and Pte. R. Pollon to take out the gun. They stalked it for a while, getting into a good fire position and in a short time sent a volley of bombs at the gun which wrote it off completely. This enabled the Coy to continue its advance. When they were almost to their objective the PIATS opened up on a group of houses and provided covering fire for the advancing coy. Not many bombs went off before the enemy came out waving many white flags.
#3 Sec was met at the RV by L/Sgt C. Crouse who linked up with A Coy and took off with them to their objective. Their objective consisted of some buildings and the PIATS were of inestimatable value in blasting the way for the advancing company.
On this operation we were sorry to lose Pte. J. Mason who was killed on the DZ. We had wounded: Ptes, Kolcun, McCarthy, Kirby, Carlton, and Morneau.
Piat Pl Commander
L/Sgt D. Fairborn took over #1 Sec and was attached to C Coy. Cpl A Pearson commanded #2 Sec with "B" Coy and L/Sgt C. Crouse had our #3 sec with "A" Coy. L/Sgt H Holloway and our #4 AA Sec went as a protection sec for Bn HQ. All the detachment jumped with the platoon to which they were attached and on hitting the deck immediately went to their various RVs.
#1 Sec under L/Sgt Fairborn had their most active time when the enemy put in a counter-attack in "C" Coy at 0430 hrs, 25 MAR. L/Sgt Fairborn took over his four PIATS and opened up at high-angle fire. They knocked out one SP gun and were responsible for the hasty withdrawal of the remainder. In this way #1 sec assisted C Coy in repelling the counter- attack and were able to take over the enemy positions.
#2 Section was gathered together on the RV by Cpl A Pearson. They accompanied B Coy to their objective. On the way they ran into an SP gun and machine gun fire. Cpl Pearson immediately went out with Pte. K. Burr and Pte. R. Pollon to take out the gun. They stalked it for a while, getting into a good fire position and in a short time sent a volley of bombs at the gun which wrote it off completely. This enabled the Coy to continue its advance. When they were almost to their objective the PIATS opened up on a group of houses and provided covering fire for the advancing coy. Not many bombs went off before the enemy came out waving many white flags.
#3 Sec was met at the RV by L/Sgt C. Crouse who linked up with A Coy and took off with them to their objective. Their objective consisted of some buildings and the PIATS were of inestimatable value in blasting the way for the advancing company.
On this operation we were sorry to lose Pte. J. Mason who was killed on the DZ. We had wounded: Ptes, Kolcun, McCarthy, Kirby, Carlton, and Morneau.
Piat Pl Commander
Experiences of Capt (now Major) J.A. CLANCY
Experiences of Capt (now Major) J.A. CLANCY, POW from 24 MAR 45 until he escaped 15 APR 45, and reached Allied lines 18 APR 45.
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I dropped by parachute where I judged to be approx 3 to 4 miles north east of the Bn dropping zone (1547 NE 4205 DINGDEN 1/25,000).
During the descent there was rifle fire directed at me, which continued until I hit the ground. I could not identify my position.
I was able to undo the box mechanism of my harness, pull the zipper of my jump smock, and get my pistol out of the holster. I fired eleven rounds and managed to wound two Germans. Three Germans sneaked up from the rear and proceeded to tear my equipment from me. I was then marched to their HQ and met by a German Parachute Lieut, taken into the cellar of the building and thoroughly searched.
I was left with only my personal clothing I wore, my identity card, 100 marks invasion currency, 20 cigarettes, 1 box matches, and 4 razor blades. I was allowed to keep my camouflage smock, web belt and beret. Fifteen minutes after I was captured, another PW, an American Airforce Captain was brought into the HQ.
Three times during the day I managed to get outside to urinate and attempted to orient myself on the ground and be prepared to escape if the opportunity came. Bach time I was allowed out I was accompanied by two or three guards. Throughout the day I tried to discover my position on a German map board, but each time I moved to get a view of the map it was taken from my view. I was interrogated briefly about allied plans and dispositions of troops. When I refused to discuss this, they resorted to political discussions, which was also fruitless. At approx 2100 hrs that evening I, and an American Airforce Capt, and 15 wounded (allied and Enemy) were transported to a hospital after three hours journey. Here the wounded were discharged.
The American officer and myself were taken to a small group of isolated farm buildings after 1 hrs journey from the hospital. We were made to stand outside for 1 hour and at approx 0200 hrs we were taken inside and searched singly by two interrogators.
I was then questioned for 1 hour by both interrogators. Like all other interrogators they began by apologizing for the unconfortable surroundings. I was then shown 1 pr of 1 Cdn Para Bn badges. The interrogator held them beside those on my tunic which I wore and I was asked if I recognized them. I said nothing. I was then questioned about Coy, Bn, Bde, and Div objectives of the day's operation. I was asked if I knew Brig Hill or General Gale. I was then asked what my command was. Further questioning demanded of me the state of preparation of other Airborne Divs, and if further Airborne operations were planned for the continent. They then demanded to know the strength of a section in a platoon.
Particular interest and curiosity was shown by the interrogator in the 1 Can Para Bn. They demanded to know if we were extra to the establishment of the 6th Airborne Division or part of the establishment. They also stated that the two Para Bdes of the 6 Airborne Div were 3 Bde and 5 Bde.
For at least ten minutes they asked me again and again if 1 Can Para Bn was surplus to the establishment to the Div or in the 3 Bde or 5 Bde. Through all questions I answered either "I don't know" or "I Can't say" and equally as often they reminded me if necessary the proper measures would be taken to obtain the desired information. I reminded then that I was only compelled to give my name and rank. The interrogator answered "That was good enough in 1940, Capt Clancy, but now we are fighting for our very existence and we shall do what over is necessary to obtain the desired information. After refusing to state what Bde I was in or whether I was in the 6 Airborne Div. They adjourned for the evening at approx 0300 hrs, 25 MAR 45.
Whether I refused to reply, or answered "I don't know or can't say, they invariably wrote something in their notes. During the interrogation many of the questions were preceded by the statement "we already know this information but must only ask it as a matter of form. When it was pointed out to them that it was obviously unnecessary for me to answer the questions if they have the answers they invariable became a bit nettled. We were allowed to sleep in the stables of the farm, until 0730 hrs the next morning when I was taken back to the HQ for an hours interrogation at 1000 hrs. The process was repeated again with more numerous threats. I was sent outside the house under guard. Two SS men were called in and the Major of the area. Nothing further developed and we were allowed to return to the stables to rest until approx 0300 hrs 26 MAR 45 Te were then given our first food since capture, consisting of 1/5 of a loaf of bread and some meat. We marched until 1100 hrs when we reached a group of farm buildings near GEMEN. Here we were again searched and briefly interrogated. We were given 1 bowl of soup and a slice of bread. At dusk our column began a march which lasted until 0800 hrs 27 MAR 45. Here we remained in a group of buildings, where we were again searched. On the night of the 28th we marched to a railway station approx 5 kilos away where we entrained. We were loaded 40 to 50 men to a cattle car. The train trip lasted for three days. The first two days of the journey we were locked in the car and not allowed to urinate defecate or have water. Some of the towns we passed through are LINGERECH, HASBERGEN, HOURDE, GEMEN, MUNSTER, LEMKE, NIENBURG, YEDDINGEN, FLIELMGEN, SOLTAV and FOLINGBOSTEL. Throughout the trip the wounded were not treated any differently from the fit. We reached FOLLINGBOSTEL at approx noon 31 MAR 45, and were marched several kilos to Stalag 11B. Here we were searched and interrogated and allotted to a lager, in the camp. We remained at Stalag 11B until 7 APR 45. I was registered there as prisoner of war 01863.
Throughout the week we were allowed to attend religious services, and attend medical parades when necessary. Our greatest difficulty was food. Our ration being 1 bowl of ersatz coffee at 0730 hrs, 1 bowl of soup at 1100 hrs and 1 bowl of ersatz coffee at 1300 hrs, 1/7 of a loaf of bread per man, 1 table spoon of sugar and 1 small piece of German margarine and 3 to 5 small boiled potatoes, for a 24 hrs period. We were among the more fortunate ones to secure 1/5 and 1/4 of a Red Cross parcel during the week at Stalag 11B. Sanitary conditions in our lager were completely neglected by the camp authorities. Men were daily dying from malnutrition, and hospital facilities were not large enough to accommodate the ill PWs of all allied nations were detained in Stalag 11B. It was the intention of the German authorities to transfer officer PWs to a camp hear BRUSSWICK.
Accordingly a party of thirty British and American officers entrained at FOLLINGBOSTEL at approx 0700 hrs, 7 APR 45.
We passed through SOLTAV where we changed trains. Approx 2 hrs ride from SOLTAV the train was halted and we were ordered to get cover because of an air raid. American bombers bombed railway lines a couple of miles ahead of us. The train was forced to return to SOLTAV, and we were kept in a group outside the station.
At approx 1830 hrs 4 typhoons strafed the station destroying the signal box, two AA railway cars, petrol, and amn dump and damaged the station in which we were in. Six of the officers in our group were wounded, and 1 of our guards was killed. We were taken to a nearby medical station, where a German Colonel's attitude towards us indicated much displeasure at our sight. The six wounded were finally treated. Capt Harry Hewitt, SHAEF, RA, organized our column and we were forced to march back to Stalag 11B with our wounded, because of the displeasure of the local Gestapo officer. The march took from 2130 hrs, 7 Apr 45 to 0430 hrs 8 Apr 45. On our return to Stalag 11B, the wounded were taken to hospital. We were allowed 1 hrs sleep, awakened for roll call, and prepared to leave camp. At 1100 hrs the same morning we marched from camp and marched each day with the exception of 1 day while we rested.
I cannot remember the particular towns or villages through which we marched. On 13 Apr we passed through a small town near SOLTAV which I recognised from our train ride of the 7 Apr. Throughout the week we lived mostly off the land, our own group most respectfully and capably cared for by a party of 100 British Empire PW under command of RSM John ROUSSOW South African Army.
His courage and ability was a source of inspiration to us all. Our own particular column numbered approx 1500. I had heard it stated that our complete column numbered 10000. We reached BARNSTEDT during the afternoon of the 14 Apr 45, where we were to remain until 1300 hrs 15 Apr 45, where we would march to LUNABERGE and cross the ELBE enroute to LUBECK. During the morning of the 15 Apr we had heard that UELZEN had been captured by an American Army. A party of three consisting of Lt. Jack SIMPSON MM, 7 Para Bn., Mr Jeffrey BOCCA, British War correspondent, Daily Express, and myself decided to escape. RSM Roussow arranged that our absence would not be detected by substituting 3 men from another column.
Food taken along consisted of the following: 12 boiled potatoes 1 tin canned meat, 15 pan cakes made of bread and water; escape equipment consisting of 1 watch to be used to maintain direction by day, and a knowledge of the stars to guide us by night. Simpson and I both had some cigarettes and matches. We left the column at 1255 hrs 15 Apr 45 north of the villaged to a small swampy wood, laid up for a few minutes while some German soldiers in nearby house went inside, hid our berets, and walked NW approx 750 yds across some open ground. We decided against appearing crawling across this area because it would only excite the suspicion of anyone seeing us. Since we possessed no knowledge of the country, and no compass or maps, and we could not regard any civilians as friendly, we decided that we must appear as nonchalant as possible and if observed at a distance to be considered as refugees by day.
At night if we were accosted we were to pass off as French slave labourers. We laid up in a wood NW of BARNSTEDT for approx 15 min. where we were discovered by a group of children playing about the area. We then moved 1000 yds farther into the wood and proceeded west across ½ mile of open country until we entered what I know to be FORST EBSTORF. We travelled through this wood until night fall. Only once were we nearly detected at approx 1830 hrs while crossing a road in FORST EBSTORF we saw two German soldiers on bicycles coming towards us 200 yds away. We immediately doubled back several yds into the wood and lay behind cover until they passed. We then proceeded on our way until dusk. We slept until dawn 16 Apr. During our period of escape whenever we slept one always remained awake for two reasons, to prevent the other two snoring; and secondly, if detected, the one awake would be sufficiently alert to make a plan to prevent capture.
At dawn the next morning we proceeded to march until 0800 hrs across open country and through woods. At one point in order to get to the closest large wood as possible, we had to march about 1500 yds across woods and field near a village under the view of ten to twelve people working in nearby fields. We were not halted or shouted at as we expected. Once in the wood we slept for several hours and were just about to leave cover of the wood when two SP guns opened fire. We moved back to place of cover in the wood and decided to lay up and discover enemy positions and strength. We intended to leave that evening but the moon was too bright and we decided against it. From the firing in the wood that day we judged there to be 6 and 8 SP guns and two AA guns and several miles back two artillery pieces. In the afternoon two German soldiers passed by 200 yds from our position. In the early evening two civilians passed by our position, about the same distance.
We finished our food and water the afternoon of the 16. On the evening of the 17 we waited until 2300 hrs when the moon became partly obscured, and we moved north of the wood about 500 yds into open country. We marched due west approx 1 mile finding a stream on the way. We then marched until 0500 hrs the morning of the 18 avoiding all wooded areas and buildings and personnel. Three times during the night we were discovered by dogs and whenever this happened we made a circuit about the area and marched southwest, southeast or south, according to the openess of the country. On one occasion at approx 0300 hrs we heard what sounded like a tank revving up. They were signallying someone by means of a white spot light. At approx 0500 hrs we sought cover in a near by wood. We crawled 500 yds into a wood to get a spot suitable for resting up. The moon by this time had become obscured and we could not keep direction. We therefore decided to rest up until sunup, regain our direction and continue on our way.
We thought on reaching our resting place in the wood two men coughed in their sleep close by to our right and to our left. Since we could not make our way out of the wood because of the darkness and of the noise we might make in moving out, thereby awakening the two sleeping men, we decided to wait until first light and crawled out of the wood to another wood about 1500 yds away. Here we had to wait up until the sun rose some time after dawn. We then marched south and entered 11th Armd Div lines at 0940 hrs, 18 Apr 45. We were identified by Maj John CAMERON, 13 Fd Sqn RE, BLA.
Previously there had been opportunities to escape, but a combination of one or more of the following reasons made the possibility of a successful return to allied lines impossible: (1) no map (2) no compass (3) no information as to the progress and success of allied arms and lines (4) Iack of food and poor physical state we found ourselves (5) an unfriendly country and inhabitants where even a child or a dog could betray us. We were able to overcome the lack of (1) and (2). We did not have truthful information. Uelzen only fell to allied arms four days after we made our escape. We were able to get what food we had on escape through the good offices of RSM Roussow and his column. I cannot give a detailed plan of our escape route because of lack of map and compass and we dared not to discover names of villages during our escape because of possibility of detection and capture.
During our period of capture we found that the German, be he soldier or civilian, incapable of fulfilling a given promise, whether to aid the wounded or give only a drink of water. The civilians regarded us with a mixture of fear, hatred and insolence. On one occasion at Nienburg, a woman of approx fifty years of age, stood on the corner as we marched by and spat at us in the column and called us "SHWINEHUNDE". Many rear line soldiers and civilians tacitly admitted their lost cause, but afraid of terrorism they continued their part. Worse than a lack of physical comforts and food and water we felt, was our loss of freedom.
The above is an honest and true account of my life from 1010 hrs, 24 MAR 45 to 0940 hrs, 18 APR 45 as I can recall from memory.
(J.A. CLANCY) MAJOR
1 CDN PARA BN.
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I dropped by parachute where I judged to be approx 3 to 4 miles north east of the Bn dropping zone (1547 NE 4205 DINGDEN 1/25,000).
During the descent there was rifle fire directed at me, which continued until I hit the ground. I could not identify my position.
I was able to undo the box mechanism of my harness, pull the zipper of my jump smock, and get my pistol out of the holster. I fired eleven rounds and managed to wound two Germans. Three Germans sneaked up from the rear and proceeded to tear my equipment from me. I was then marched to their HQ and met by a German Parachute Lieut, taken into the cellar of the building and thoroughly searched.
I was left with only my personal clothing I wore, my identity card, 100 marks invasion currency, 20 cigarettes, 1 box matches, and 4 razor blades. I was allowed to keep my camouflage smock, web belt and beret. Fifteen minutes after I was captured, another PW, an American Airforce Captain was brought into the HQ.
Three times during the day I managed to get outside to urinate and attempted to orient myself on the ground and be prepared to escape if the opportunity came. Bach time I was allowed out I was accompanied by two or three guards. Throughout the day I tried to discover my position on a German map board, but each time I moved to get a view of the map it was taken from my view. I was interrogated briefly about allied plans and dispositions of troops. When I refused to discuss this, they resorted to political discussions, which was also fruitless. At approx 2100 hrs that evening I, and an American Airforce Capt, and 15 wounded (allied and Enemy) were transported to a hospital after three hours journey. Here the wounded were discharged.
The American officer and myself were taken to a small group of isolated farm buildings after 1 hrs journey from the hospital. We were made to stand outside for 1 hour and at approx 0200 hrs we were taken inside and searched singly by two interrogators.
I was then questioned for 1 hour by both interrogators. Like all other interrogators they began by apologizing for the unconfortable surroundings. I was then shown 1 pr of 1 Cdn Para Bn badges. The interrogator held them beside those on my tunic which I wore and I was asked if I recognized them. I said nothing. I was then questioned about Coy, Bn, Bde, and Div objectives of the day's operation. I was asked if I knew Brig Hill or General Gale. I was then asked what my command was. Further questioning demanded of me the state of preparation of other Airborne Divs, and if further Airborne operations were planned for the continent. They then demanded to know the strength of a section in a platoon.
Particular interest and curiosity was shown by the interrogator in the 1 Can Para Bn. They demanded to know if we were extra to the establishment of the 6th Airborne Division or part of the establishment. They also stated that the two Para Bdes of the 6 Airborne Div were 3 Bde and 5 Bde.
For at least ten minutes they asked me again and again if 1 Can Para Bn was surplus to the establishment to the Div or in the 3 Bde or 5 Bde. Through all questions I answered either "I don't know" or "I Can't say" and equally as often they reminded me if necessary the proper measures would be taken to obtain the desired information. I reminded then that I was only compelled to give my name and rank. The interrogator answered "That was good enough in 1940, Capt Clancy, but now we are fighting for our very existence and we shall do what over is necessary to obtain the desired information. After refusing to state what Bde I was in or whether I was in the 6 Airborne Div. They adjourned for the evening at approx 0300 hrs, 25 MAR 45.
Whether I refused to reply, or answered "I don't know or can't say, they invariably wrote something in their notes. During the interrogation many of the questions were preceded by the statement "we already know this information but must only ask it as a matter of form. When it was pointed out to them that it was obviously unnecessary for me to answer the questions if they have the answers they invariable became a bit nettled. We were allowed to sleep in the stables of the farm, until 0730 hrs the next morning when I was taken back to the HQ for an hours interrogation at 1000 hrs. The process was repeated again with more numerous threats. I was sent outside the house under guard. Two SS men were called in and the Major of the area. Nothing further developed and we were allowed to return to the stables to rest until approx 0300 hrs 26 MAR 45 Te were then given our first food since capture, consisting of 1/5 of a loaf of bread and some meat. We marched until 1100 hrs when we reached a group of farm buildings near GEMEN. Here we were again searched and briefly interrogated. We were given 1 bowl of soup and a slice of bread. At dusk our column began a march which lasted until 0800 hrs 27 MAR 45. Here we remained in a group of buildings, where we were again searched. On the night of the 28th we marched to a railway station approx 5 kilos away where we entrained. We were loaded 40 to 50 men to a cattle car. The train trip lasted for three days. The first two days of the journey we were locked in the car and not allowed to urinate defecate or have water. Some of the towns we passed through are LINGERECH, HASBERGEN, HOURDE, GEMEN, MUNSTER, LEMKE, NIENBURG, YEDDINGEN, FLIELMGEN, SOLTAV and FOLINGBOSTEL. Throughout the trip the wounded were not treated any differently from the fit. We reached FOLLINGBOSTEL at approx noon 31 MAR 45, and were marched several kilos to Stalag 11B. Here we were searched and interrogated and allotted to a lager, in the camp. We remained at Stalag 11B until 7 APR 45. I was registered there as prisoner of war 01863.
Throughout the week we were allowed to attend religious services, and attend medical parades when necessary. Our greatest difficulty was food. Our ration being 1 bowl of ersatz coffee at 0730 hrs, 1 bowl of soup at 1100 hrs and 1 bowl of ersatz coffee at 1300 hrs, 1/7 of a loaf of bread per man, 1 table spoon of sugar and 1 small piece of German margarine and 3 to 5 small boiled potatoes, for a 24 hrs period. We were among the more fortunate ones to secure 1/5 and 1/4 of a Red Cross parcel during the week at Stalag 11B. Sanitary conditions in our lager were completely neglected by the camp authorities. Men were daily dying from malnutrition, and hospital facilities were not large enough to accommodate the ill PWs of all allied nations were detained in Stalag 11B. It was the intention of the German authorities to transfer officer PWs to a camp hear BRUSSWICK.
Accordingly a party of thirty British and American officers entrained at FOLLINGBOSTEL at approx 0700 hrs, 7 APR 45.
We passed through SOLTAV where we changed trains. Approx 2 hrs ride from SOLTAV the train was halted and we were ordered to get cover because of an air raid. American bombers bombed railway lines a couple of miles ahead of us. The train was forced to return to SOLTAV, and we were kept in a group outside the station.
At approx 1830 hrs 4 typhoons strafed the station destroying the signal box, two AA railway cars, petrol, and amn dump and damaged the station in which we were in. Six of the officers in our group were wounded, and 1 of our guards was killed. We were taken to a nearby medical station, where a German Colonel's attitude towards us indicated much displeasure at our sight. The six wounded were finally treated. Capt Harry Hewitt, SHAEF, RA, organized our column and we were forced to march back to Stalag 11B with our wounded, because of the displeasure of the local Gestapo officer. The march took from 2130 hrs, 7 Apr 45 to 0430 hrs 8 Apr 45. On our return to Stalag 11B, the wounded were taken to hospital. We were allowed 1 hrs sleep, awakened for roll call, and prepared to leave camp. At 1100 hrs the same morning we marched from camp and marched each day with the exception of 1 day while we rested.
I cannot remember the particular towns or villages through which we marched. On 13 Apr we passed through a small town near SOLTAV which I recognised from our train ride of the 7 Apr. Throughout the week we lived mostly off the land, our own group most respectfully and capably cared for by a party of 100 British Empire PW under command of RSM John ROUSSOW South African Army.
His courage and ability was a source of inspiration to us all. Our own particular column numbered approx 1500. I had heard it stated that our complete column numbered 10000. We reached BARNSTEDT during the afternoon of the 14 Apr 45, where we were to remain until 1300 hrs 15 Apr 45, where we would march to LUNABERGE and cross the ELBE enroute to LUBECK. During the morning of the 15 Apr we had heard that UELZEN had been captured by an American Army. A party of three consisting of Lt. Jack SIMPSON MM, 7 Para Bn., Mr Jeffrey BOCCA, British War correspondent, Daily Express, and myself decided to escape. RSM Roussow arranged that our absence would not be detected by substituting 3 men from another column.
Food taken along consisted of the following: 12 boiled potatoes 1 tin canned meat, 15 pan cakes made of bread and water; escape equipment consisting of 1 watch to be used to maintain direction by day, and a knowledge of the stars to guide us by night. Simpson and I both had some cigarettes and matches. We left the column at 1255 hrs 15 Apr 45 north of the villaged to a small swampy wood, laid up for a few minutes while some German soldiers in nearby house went inside, hid our berets, and walked NW approx 750 yds across some open ground. We decided against appearing crawling across this area because it would only excite the suspicion of anyone seeing us. Since we possessed no knowledge of the country, and no compass or maps, and we could not regard any civilians as friendly, we decided that we must appear as nonchalant as possible and if observed at a distance to be considered as refugees by day.
At night if we were accosted we were to pass off as French slave labourers. We laid up in a wood NW of BARNSTEDT for approx 15 min. where we were discovered by a group of children playing about the area. We then moved 1000 yds farther into the wood and proceeded west across ½ mile of open country until we entered what I know to be FORST EBSTORF. We travelled through this wood until night fall. Only once were we nearly detected at approx 1830 hrs while crossing a road in FORST EBSTORF we saw two German soldiers on bicycles coming towards us 200 yds away. We immediately doubled back several yds into the wood and lay behind cover until they passed. We then proceeded on our way until dusk. We slept until dawn 16 Apr. During our period of escape whenever we slept one always remained awake for two reasons, to prevent the other two snoring; and secondly, if detected, the one awake would be sufficiently alert to make a plan to prevent capture.
At dawn the next morning we proceeded to march until 0800 hrs across open country and through woods. At one point in order to get to the closest large wood as possible, we had to march about 1500 yds across woods and field near a village under the view of ten to twelve people working in nearby fields. We were not halted or shouted at as we expected. Once in the wood we slept for several hours and were just about to leave cover of the wood when two SP guns opened fire. We moved back to place of cover in the wood and decided to lay up and discover enemy positions and strength. We intended to leave that evening but the moon was too bright and we decided against it. From the firing in the wood that day we judged there to be 6 and 8 SP guns and two AA guns and several miles back two artillery pieces. In the afternoon two German soldiers passed by 200 yds from our position. In the early evening two civilians passed by our position, about the same distance.
We finished our food and water the afternoon of the 16. On the evening of the 17 we waited until 2300 hrs when the moon became partly obscured, and we moved north of the wood about 500 yds into open country. We marched due west approx 1 mile finding a stream on the way. We then marched until 0500 hrs the morning of the 18 avoiding all wooded areas and buildings and personnel. Three times during the night we were discovered by dogs and whenever this happened we made a circuit about the area and marched southwest, southeast or south, according to the openess of the country. On one occasion at approx 0300 hrs we heard what sounded like a tank revving up. They were signallying someone by means of a white spot light. At approx 0500 hrs we sought cover in a near by wood. We crawled 500 yds into a wood to get a spot suitable for resting up. The moon by this time had become obscured and we could not keep direction. We therefore decided to rest up until sunup, regain our direction and continue on our way.
We thought on reaching our resting place in the wood two men coughed in their sleep close by to our right and to our left. Since we could not make our way out of the wood because of the darkness and of the noise we might make in moving out, thereby awakening the two sleeping men, we decided to wait until first light and crawled out of the wood to another wood about 1500 yds away. Here we had to wait up until the sun rose some time after dawn. We then marched south and entered 11th Armd Div lines at 0940 hrs, 18 Apr 45. We were identified by Maj John CAMERON, 13 Fd Sqn RE, BLA.
Previously there had been opportunities to escape, but a combination of one or more of the following reasons made the possibility of a successful return to allied lines impossible: (1) no map (2) no compass (3) no information as to the progress and success of allied arms and lines (4) Iack of food and poor physical state we found ourselves (5) an unfriendly country and inhabitants where even a child or a dog could betray us. We were able to overcome the lack of (1) and (2). We did not have truthful information. Uelzen only fell to allied arms four days after we made our escape. We were able to get what food we had on escape through the good offices of RSM Roussow and his column. I cannot give a detailed plan of our escape route because of lack of map and compass and we dared not to discover names of villages during our escape because of possibility of detection and capture.
During our period of capture we found that the German, be he soldier or civilian, incapable of fulfilling a given promise, whether to aid the wounded or give only a drink of water. The civilians regarded us with a mixture of fear, hatred and insolence. On one occasion at Nienburg, a woman of approx fifty years of age, stood on the corner as we marched by and spat at us in the column and called us "SHWINEHUNDE". Many rear line soldiers and civilians tacitly admitted their lost cause, but afraid of terrorism they continued their part. Worse than a lack of physical comforts and food and water we felt, was our loss of freedom.
The above is an honest and true account of my life from 1010 hrs, 24 MAR 45 to 0940 hrs, 18 APR 45 as I can recall from memory.
(J.A. CLANCY) MAJOR
1 CDN PARA BN.
