RM CDOS - 40 Commando 1945 | April | Special Forces Roll Of Honour

April

PLACE	DATE	HOUR	SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND INFORMATION	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES
In line	1		Operation 'ROAST'	See appendices "A.1." & "D.1." & "F.1."
	2		do;
Italy. 89 1:100,000 M/R 6334	3	1400	Commando move to bivouac area.
	4		Cleaning up.
	5		do.
	6		do.
	7		Commando stands by to move.
	8		do.
	9		do.
M/R525528	10	1630	Commando move to assembly area.
M/R494556		2115	Arrive F.U.P.
	11		Operation "IMPACT"	See appendix "A.2." and "F.2."
	12		do.
	13		do.
M/R633458 M/R 5738	14		Commando arrives at PORTO CORSINI. H.Q.Administration at RAVENNA.
P.CORSINI	15		Settle in.
	16		Cleaning up. Commando formed into 3 fighting tps and H.W.tp.
		1400	Commando parade. Address by the C.O.
	17		Cleaning up. "A" & "X" tps attached to 2 Commando Bde.
	18		Administration.
	19		Administration and Unit Training. Lt.Col.R.W.Sankey,D.S.O.,D.S.C.,R.M. moved to U.K. Lt.Col.I.D.De'Ath,D.S.O.,R.M. assumed command. H.Q.Administration, less Q.M.Stores move to PORTO CORSINI.
	20		Administration. "A" & "X" tps return to unit.
	21		Administration.
	22	1100	Commando parade. Talk by the C.O. Church parade.
	23		Administration and Unit Training.
	24		Administration and Unit Training.
	25		do; do;
		1400	Commando parade. Inspection and address by Brigadier R.F.J. Tod, D.S.O., Brigade Commnder.
	26		Administration and Unit Training. Lt.J.G.Matters, R.M. attached to 2 Commando Bde as L.O. Capt.W.G.Reid R.M. appointed Adjutant. Capt.E.R.Cooper, R.M. appointed A.O.
	27		Administration and Unit Training.
	28		Lt.Col.I.D.De'Ath, D.S.O.,R.M. on leve. Capt.W.G.Reid, R.M. assumes command.
	29	1130	Church parade; Sunday routine.
	30		Administration and Unit training.

APPENDIX F.1

REPORT ON OPERATION "ROAST".

MAP. ITALY 1:100,000 1:25,000
SHEET 89;89 1 SW

At 2000 hrs H.Q. were established in Dug Outs adjoining the pumping atation at 626531, and at 2230 hrs the Commando "Stood To".

Earlier covering fire was given by our mortars to assist "X" to who were driving stakes into the bank of the RENO in preparation for the feint attack. This was completed by 2230 hrs.

"Q" and "Y" tps holding the SPIT were under mortar fire for a short period at 2300 hrs when the Wood area was shelled. At 0400 hrs fwd tps from 43 Cdo passed through "Y" tp positions and were pulling back to the wood.

At 0455 the attack went in and 43 Cdo tps left the wood and went through our posns and had passed WOLF 1 by 0515 hrs. M/R 639567

The area was rocketted and shelled from approx 0520 hrs to 0645 hrs, a Spandau opened up from the other side of the river across the front of our posns.

At 0800 hrs, 6 sec in one of the pillboxes at WOLF 1 withdrew to WOLF 2 posn M/R 638557 on orders from the C.O., and shortly afterwards a direct hit from a heavy gun demolished the seaward pillbox and a near miss badly damaged the central one. "Q" tp withdrew to WOODFORCE H.Q. at 1400 hrs. PW's were coming in steadily and were escorted back to the cage by "y" tp throughout the day.

"Q" & "Y" tps withdrew to H.Q. area at 1100 hrs on 3rd Apl.45.

On receipt of "ATTACK", "X" tp hauled their boats over the top of the bank of the RENO to the water, unfortunately the ground was too rough and not all the boats reached the water. The rifles attached to the dummies were fired. Bren guns, 2" mortar and TSMG's and PLATS gave covering fire until the receipt of the word stop. Supporting fire from arty and 3" mortar was also received, and the enemy returned heavy fire from various weapons.

The feint attack was a success, it had achieved its purpose in drawing enemy fire.

"A" tp who were supporting the tank attack moved off at 0730 hrs from 583559 to secure objective MARK. At the first ditch it was found necessary to use fascenes to get over the dyke as the width and the supporting sub-sdl had been under estimated. The tks kept getting bogged and more fascenes were brought up. At 1330 hrs the first tk had crossed the dyke. The tp moved up in sections clearing foxholes on the way. The leading tk fired 2 or 3 shells into a house and about 5 mins later the enemy opened up causing 3 cas in the tk gp. The remainder took cover behind the tks and 2" mortars gave smoke and HE on the left as cover for Lt.Marsh's sec. The wounded were brought in under cover of this screen and of LMG fire of Mne Williamson who stayed out in the open with absolutely no cover at all for a full 18 mins whilst he was being sniped at and fired upon by enemy MG's. At approx 1515 hrs enemy were observed waving a white flag and PWs came through their minefields towards us being fired on by their own tps. Cpl.Ward's sec was brought up to the second tk, and the first one carried on through the minefield ahead. Lt.Marsh was contacted and found to be wounded and he ordered Lt.Seales to carry on to MARK with 'A' tp under his command. The first tk got bogged soon after leaving C; DELL OLMO M/R 596558 the second going back some 500x to a house and then coming back again by the lower river bank. The other tk was knocked out by a Tellermine. No enemy posns were contacted, and it was heard that 43 Cdo were in MATTHEW and contact was made. Receiving orders from SUNRAY the tp returned by the river crossing by Partisan Fwd HQ.

OWN CASUALTIES. Killed 3 O.R.'s
Wounded 1 Officer 16 O.R.'s

Battle Report of "A" Troop on Operation "ROAST"
1/2 Apr 45.

On taking over the positions on the F.U.P. from the Italians, 3 positions had to be manned and guarded till first light. The remainder of the men into foxholes in the river bank.

At 0730 hrs 2nd Apr an O Group of Lieut Marsh, Lieut Seales and a covering section moved forward to start line to recce first ditch. It was found necessary to use the first lot of Fascenes to get over the dyke as the width and the supporting subsoil had been underestimated.

The O Group stayed and the troops were brought up to help lay fascenes under guidance of Sappers and Tank men. The Tanks kept getting bogged and having to be taken out and more fascenes brought up. Eventually at 1330 hrs the first tank crossed.

With Lieut Marsh's group of two sections and HQ moving round to The left flank via a dyke, and Lieut Seales section and Tp HQ following the second tank, the first having a small section behind it to be used for clearing foxholes. The Troop set off. The leading tank fired 2 or 3 shells into the house as it moved down. About five minutes later the enemy opened up causing 3 casualties in the tank group. The remainder took cover behind the tanks and down the right hand side of them. Our 2" Mortars then opened up to give smoke and H.E. on the left as cover for Lieut Marsh's section. This only gave partial cover, had the 38 sets been working proper and contact made range could have been altered. However the smoke served to screen the enemy fore from the tanks till our wounded could be brought in. Smoke was stopped after a while as it was thought that it would stop the tanks fire. The last wounded were brought in under cover of L.M.G. fire of Mne Williamson who stayed out in the open with obsoletely no cover at all for a full 18 minutes, while he was being sniped at and brought under fire from enemy M.G's.

During the operation observation was kept up from the corners and the back of the tank and enemy posts located. There were no enemy in the house all having put in the foxholes lining the bank of the river. A sniper who later turn out to be a German officer kept firing at the corners of the tank. Tracer taken from Bren Mags and put in rifles put the tanks onto enemy positions. Spasmodic Bren fire from Williamson kept the enemies head down for a pause of 2 minutes. Contacts were very bad with 38 and 18 sets. The noise of the tank engines made it very difficult for any orders to be heard or any messages received or given. Contact was mainly through Lieut Wilkies 38 set and his 18 set in rear HQ. a force to bring in reserve ammo S.B.A'S and to keep further contact with the tanks.

On receiving messages for stretchers to be brought up two Medical Orderlies who had missed the landing with 9 Cdo and volunteered to come with us, together with L/Cpl Payne with utter disregard for there own safety came up to the tanks with an improvised Red Cross on a white flag. The walking wounded and stretcher case were sent back to start line. There upon the same party came in answer to a call from Lieut Marsh's section on the left flank. At approx 1515 hrs enemy were observed waving a white flag and prisoners then came through their minefields towards the tanks. Some were fired on by their own troops. The sniper still kept firing at the tank. I went up to the first tank to Cpl Ward's group to get closer to the prisoners and wave them in. During my absense the sniper shot Mine GRIFFEN through the head. Our own troops were seen behind the prisoners and on the enemies positions and when the prisoners reach the second tank all firing ceased.

The tanks would not move until orders were received from Lieut Marsh to go forward. I brought Cpl Wards section to the second tank and the first one carried or through the minefield ahead.

On contacting Lieut Marsh I found him wounded and I was ordered to carry on to MARK with "A" Tp under my command. The leading tank officer, Lieut Wilkie myself, and the MOA's did a short reccy. I then held a O Group on lines of advance etc I told the troops what we were doing and asked for

(a) The sappers to be brought up

(b) To have the R.A.P. established at Casa del Olmo

(d) Divided the tps into three fresh groups, under myself lieut Wilkie, and Cpl Dixon.

(e) Carry on to MARK.

The first tank got bogged soon after leaving Del Olmo, there was a pause while the second tank went back some 500 yds to a house and then back to us again by lower river bank. Waited for the other tank which was knocked out by a Tellermine. No enemy positions were contacted and we heard that 43 RM. Cdo in Matthew. I asked for orders from Sunray Contacted 43 RM.Cdo and received orders to return. Picked up as many weapons and Bren megs as possible on the way back. Sent the troop back by the river crossing near Partisan forward H.Q. I stayed behind with Lieut Wilkie and our M.0.A.'s to collect Mne Griffen personal effects and gather material for the "I" sec.

Signed :- Watson E. Seales
Lieut R.M.
"A" Tp.

Battle Report of "P" Troop on Operation "ROAST"
1/2 Apr 45.

2230 hrs 1 Apr	"Stand To"
0207 hrs 2 Apr	2/3 "Stand Down" on receipt of message from Sunray
0420 hrs	Barrage commenced.
0815 hrs	Shelling at 0815 hrs consisted of about 9 rounds thought to be 105mm which landed 100 yds to the left of the dug in positions. Two rounds at least falling into the river. After the recce 0900 to 1000 hrs plans were made for one Bren Group to cross the river to Casa del OMO in a small river boat which was lying in "FRANKLIN" position, covered by the remainder of the section. It is considered that this operation could have been carried out and if more boats had been available the whole of the section could have crossed the river. Permission could however not be obtained for anyone to cross the river. It was impossible at anytime between 0900 and 1700 hrs to give the attacking troops any support, as small arms fire would not have reached them and 2" mortar would have been unobserved and therefore dangerous as their exact positions were unknown. At no time during the operation could either the enemy or our own troops be seen and no enemy movement was observed. No P.O.W's crossed the river into "FRANKLIN" and our own troops suffered no casualities. From 0900 direct communication between "FRANKLIN" and 61 HQ was unobtainable owing to breaking of the cable between "ROOSEVELT" and "EISENHOWER" with the result that there was some delay in the transmission and receipt of messages.

Signed P. Wedgwood,
Lieut RM.
O.C. "P" Troop
6 Apr 45

Battle Report of "Q" Troop on Operation "ROAST"
1/2 Apr 45.

2045hrs 1 Apr	Sgt Scott and the two Bren teams moved through Wolf 2 to their position on the river bank.
2115hrs	Normal enemy harrassing mortar fire on forward edge of wood MR 636563.
2130hrs	Forward troops of 43 R.M. Commando began to infiltrate to the Pillbox positions Wolf 1 in sub-section strength. No enemy fire.
2330hrs	Sgt Scott reported Five wheeled vehicles moving away from him on the opposite side of the river. Our Arty fire followed a few minutes later in the correct area. Sgt Scott reported a line running from the TONGUE across the river. This was cut at 2355 hrs.
0415hrs 2 Apr	Forward troops of 43 R.M. Commando began to infiltrate back through Pillbox positions, by 0445 hrs approx a troop strength had passed through.
0455hrs	Barrage on our sector began.
0505hrs	43 R.M. Commando forward troops returned to their original positions and had passed through WOLF 1 by 0515 hrs.
0520hrs	Enemy fired into rockets into our positions and then mortared the area, odd shelling continued until approx 0645 hrs. Meanwhile Spandau fire from end of TONGUE and across the other side of the river opened up across the front of our positions.
0545hrs to 0615hrs	Kangaroos and Churchill tanks were forming up on the beach at MR 640566.
0615hrs	Sgt Scott and his Bren gunners returned through our positions.
0800hrs	6 Section in WOLF 1 withdrew on orders from the C.O. Just afterwards a direct hit from a heavy gun demolished the seaward Pillbox and a near miss from the same gun badly damaged the central one.
1400hrs	5 Section and Troop HQ withdraw from WOLF 2 position on orders from the C.O. to WOODFORCE HQ.

Signed F.H. Bristowe,
Capt, RM.
OC. "Q" Troop
6 Apr 45.

Battle Report of "R" Troop. Operation "ROAST".
1/2 Apr 45.

Communications were checked at 2100hrs 1/4/45 and the telephone and 18 Set were found to be satisfactory. The 38 sets were found to be netted on a very busy frequency and although efforts were made to re-net no communication was established between "ROOSEVELT" and "FRANKLIN".

At 2235 I reported "R" Tp as being at "Stand To" to HQ 61. They remained at this state of readiness throughout the night.

At 0452 on the 2/4/45 the signal was received from HQ 61 "ATTACK at 0455.

The P.I.A.T. firer therefore opened fire on the shutter of the enemy observation hole on the opposite bank of the F.del RENO. Four bombs were fired, all landing in the target area. The third apparently exploded in the bank and was presumed to have entered the shutter.

At about 1000hrs a signal asking for supporting fire to enable "A" Tp to continue was received from HQ 61. A certain delay followed as the key to the M.E. Map Ref Code had to be procured from "X" Tp. before the position of "A" Tp could be established. It was found that, owing to "MARK" and "MATTHEW" still being occupied by the enemy it was impossible to give observed fire support from either "FRANKLIN" or "ROOSEVELT".

"R" Tp therefore had no further part in the operation.

W.C.POOK
Capt. RM.
O.C. "R" Troop.
6 Apr 45

BATTLE REPORT of "S" Troop on Operation "ROAST"
1/2 Apr 45.

2100 hrs 1 Apr	Mortars started to fire on "MATTHEW" I and II to cover "X" Tp who were putting stakes in the river bank. This firing was stopped after 5 minutes owing to the fact that "X" tp were not ready to start their work.
2150 hrs	Covering fire for 30 minutes from I sec Mortars 40 R.M. Cdo (4 R.P.Min) and I sec 9 Cdo (2 R.P.Min). After this shoot new baseplate position had to be made because of the soft ground.
2230 hrs	Troop "Stood To".
0315 hrs 2 Apr	Owing to delay of assault troops Troop ordered to "Stand 2/3 Down".
0430 hrs	"Stood To".
0455 hrs	Codeword "ATTACK". Mortars and M.M.Gs commenced firing on their various tasks. Mortars (9Cdo & 40 Cdo) feint assault between 611561 am 624563. M.M.Gs (2 Sec 40 Cdo I Sec 43 Cdo) on H.F. & D.F. tasks between 632564 and 634567.
0540 hrs	M.M.Gs ceased firing having fired approx 16 belts per gun.
0610 hrs	Mortars ceased firing having fired approx 400 rds per mortar. Neither M.MGs or Mortars fired again.

REMARKS.
It was found that a rapid rate of fire could not be sustained for long with the mortars, owing to the barrels over-heating and consequent premature firing of secondaries.
Base-plates on Nos 2,3,4; mortars had to be taken out and rebedded twice during the shoot.
(2) No counter fire was experienced by either Mortars or M.M.Gs.

G.M. Russell.
Lieut R.M.
O.C. "S" Troop

BATTLE REPORT OF "X" TROOP ON OPERATION "ROAST" 1/2 APRIL 1945.

2045 hrs	"Stand To". Pickets and pulleys were placed in the four different positions at the waters edge and ropes attached to the rubber boats.
2300 hrs	Enemy mortar fire bombed the area and severed the telephone communications between the sections. This was immediately mended.
2350 hrs	Enemy mortar fire ceased. The remaining of the night was reasonably quiet.
0455 hrs	The signal "ATTACK". The boats were hauled over the top of the bank down to the water. Unfortunately the ground was too rough and all the boats did not reach the water. The rifles attached to the dummies were fired. Bren guns, 2" mortars, and Piats gave covering fire and continued to fire until the receipt of the word "STOP". Rifles and TSMG's also fired. We received supporting fire from 3" mortars and hy arty. The latter's fire was falling short and endangering our own men. I asked them to increase their range which was done. The effect of all this was to draw very heavy fire, of various kinds from the enemy.
0608 hrs	The signal "STOP". By this time the enemy were only firing one spandau spasmodically, a few rifles and MP's, which they continued to do until captured by 43 RM Cdo, at 1530 hrs. On receipt of the word "STOP", we were almost out of ammunition. The few remaining rounds and bombs that we had were fired at the spandau position which had been located.
1530 hrs	43 RM Cdo took the enemy positions opposite us and we ferried across the river some 60 prisoners and three of 43's wounded. The prisoners were marched to the POW cage by some of the Tp.

G.O.Belbin.
Capt., R.M.
O.C. Troop

Battle Report of "Y" Troop Operation "ROAST"
1/2 Apr 45.

At 1600 hrs 1 Apr "Y" Tp moved into the Bde reserve area at "WOODFORCE" and proceeded to dig in. At 2230 hrs the Troop "Stood To".

The night was fairly quiet except for one short period at 2300 hrs when the enemy mortared the Wood area. Tanks could be heard moving up the beach area, about this time, but it is doubtful if the sound would have carried to the enemy lines. At 0215 hrs the order was received over the telephone to "Stand Down" a third of the Troop for an hour.

At 0400 hrs the 2I/C. of 43 R.M. Commando contacted O.C. "Y" Troop and passed the information that 43 R.M. Commando were pulling back into the wood.

O.C. "Y" Troop passed this information immediately to Sunray 61. At 0430 hrs 43 R.M. Commando were still pulling back. But at 0440 hrs the order to attack at 0450 was passed and 43 R.M. Commando were observed moving very rapidly into the attack.

The first 3 P.O.W. came back to R.A.P. area at about 0700 hrs followed shortly by a continuous flow. These P.O.W. were escorted to the P.O.W. cage by "Y" Troop who were keeping up a ferry service between the R.A.P. and the cage. This continued throughout the first day.

During the afternoon a signal arrived at "WOODFORCE" from BDE it was franked immediate and written in cypher this had to be return to Bde unread as no Cypher personnel were available. The Troop was ordered to withdrew at 1100 hrs 3 Apr 45.

D.T.M. Thomson
Capt, RM.
O.C. "Y" Troop.
6 Apr 45

APPENDIX F2

40 ROYAL MARINE COMMANDO

OPERATION 'IMPACT'

Ref Map :- ITALY 1:50,000 (Sheet 89 IV ALPHONSINE)

GENERAL.
Operation 'Impact' was carried out by 169 In Bde with tk and arty spt. The op commenced on the night of 10 Apr 45. 40 RM Cdo were to move under cover of darkness along the ARGINE running from UMANA Pump House 494556 to MENATE Pumping Station 423607 - after securing these objectives to exploit along rd STR DELLA PIOPPA running from br at 421596 and thence to Bde right flank protection.

2. Tps of 2/5, 2/6 and 2/7 Queens were to move up in first light in fantails - 2/5 on the R. to take over the br thence to secure MENATE 4158 to arrive at the br approx 0830 hours 11 Apr 45. 2/6 on L. to assault and capture LONGERSTRINO 4157. 2/7 as Bde res.

3. The blow in the ARGINE at 455592 and the mouth of the dyke 426604 were to be crossed in 6-men rubber asslt boats which were to be carried by the leading Tp. It was expected to find the blow at 455592 mined. Tg was carried out the day and night previous to the op in the ferrying of tps in rubber dinghies across a dyke - this was found to be a slow process, but apart from one or two punctures reasonably satisfactory.

TPS UNDER COMD.
4.

1 Sec Fd Coy R.E's

2 FOO's

2 'Little Johns'.

PLAN.
5. In the forming of the plan 4 main pts had to be considered:-

(1)

(a) Time to ferry unit across the blow and mouth of the dyke.

(b) Time to lift any minefields.

(d) Time for the passage of 'Little Johns'.

(e) Time for the passage of Hy Wpns.

(2) Minefields - No accurate inf was rcd except from Partisan sources who said they thought the ARGINE was mined.

(3) L of C - SAA, rations and batteries. If Bde were late only L of C was ARGINE so it was decided to tow stormboat which was SAA and rations.

(4) Importance of Br and plan to secure and hold it.

THE OPERATION.
6. 40 RM Cdo moved up to the assembly area at 525528 at 1630 hrs, 10 Apr 45 where we married up with attached tps at 1900 hrs. Movement rcvd from the assembly area to the FUP at the UMANA Pump House was not allowed in daylight as the route was under observation - the route being one way a great number of vehs were not allowed, so the tps moved from the Assembly Area to FUP by march route, and stores, hy wpns, 'Little Johns' and boats were moved up in vehicles under the cover of darkness. The Cdo was formed up at Assembly area in the correct order of march and was then ferried across the RENO - this was not expected and took considerable time; the unit being ferried over 30 men at a time - however, the unit was formed up again on the far bank of the RENO and proceeded to the FUP arriving at 2115 hrs and moved to a posn 500 yds along tje ARGINE. The loading store truck became bogged and no boats had arrived; however six asslt boats were included in the stores. After a certain amount of towing pulling and pushing vehs began to trickle through - Q Tp had been warned that they may be required to paddle asslt boats if rubber boats did not arrive. The asslt boats were rigged and placed in the water - two leaked badly and another not quite so badly. Stores and 'Little Johns' were loaded on to Stormboats. Time was getting on and it was decided to push on leaving Hy Wpns Tp to follow up. Stormboats carrying 'Little Johns' could not manouvre in the shallow water and were left behind. The Cdo commenced to move forward at 2330 hrs - Order of March :-

R.E's covered by 3 Bren Guns of "Y" Tp who were advance guard were to assist in the clearing of mines.

"P" Tp with task of securing br.

"X" Tp with task of securing Pumping Station.

Tac HQ

"A" Tp res.

Main HQ (incl RAP and stores in Stormboats).

"Q" Tp as boat party.

Owing to the late start the march became a speed march. RAF marker flares dropped for the bombing of LONGERSTRINO and MENATE became an embarrassment as the Cdo moved fwd. The blow was reached at 0130 hrs. Sappers and "y" Tp tested depth and found it too deep and muddy to wade. "y" Tp commended to ferry and were landed 50 yds past the blow. At this juncture leading elements hit the trip wire of a minefield causing 9 casualties (2 officers, 6 Mnes and 1 RE). A lane was made in the minefield and at 0300 hrs, "Y", "P", "X" and Tac HQ passed through and force marched to the end of the ARGINE leaving Main HQ, "A" and "Q" Tps to follow up. Boats were left well behind and "P" Tp, covered by "Y" Tp, pushed through and over the dyke to their objective.

7. About this time the Cdo became subject to hy and accurate 88 mm, 75 mm, 81 mm mortar, spandau and sniper fire. Fire was brought down on enemy posts by the F00s.

8. "P" Tp went on to their objective under hy arty, spandau and sniper fire.

9. Further attempts were made by "X" Tp to cross the dyke but were held by accurate crossed spandau and sniper fire.

10. "P" Tp were desperately short of ammunition and were right on their objective when an enemy SP gun crossed the br followed by infantry. The SP Gun moved to the Pumping Stn. "X" were ordered to attack under cover of a RAF fighter/bomber stonk this they did, wading the dyke, assaulting the Pumping Stn taking 33 PW. "X" Tp were ordered to move up to the br. "Q Tp taking over the Pumping Stn. "X" Tp captured the SP Gun intact which was used with some effect against the enemy.

11. Fantails with the 2/5 Queens aboard began to arrive at the br and were shot into their posns by "A" Tp and the remnants of "P" and "Y" Tps. A further 14 PWs were taken by "X" Tp. "X" Tp were still fresh with few casualties and were moved to take up their posn as Bde Rt Flank Protection. "A" Tp were moved up with a counter-attack role.

12. The Cdo then went into the role of holding br and Pumping Stn and patrolling to 2/5 Queens on the left - contact was made at 04.00 hrs 12 Apr 45.

13. At 1600 hrs, 12 Apr 45, "A","X" and "P/Y" Tps were moved to MENATE Area with task of holding MENATE Br at 417586 and original br 421596. "Q" Tp were in their original posn holding the Pumping Stn.

14. At 1600 hours 13 Apr 45, twenty-four ton TCV's arrived and said that they were to be used to return 40 RM Cdo to RAVENNA. This was checked with 169 Inf Bde and the unit moved out of the area at 1945 hrs arriving PORTO CORSINI 0230 hrs 14 Apr 45.

CASUALTIES.
15.

	Offrs	TSMs	SNCOs	JNCOs	Mnes
KILLED	3 (incl 1 Tp Comd)	2	2	8	16
WOUNDED	4 (incl 3 Tp Comds)	-	3	8	30
MISSING	-	-	-	1	12

16. Casualties inflicted on the enemy - PW approx 50 (a certain number being returned via Fantails thro' Bde), Killed - 12.

ENEMY EQUIPMENT.
17. Enemy equipment captured:-

2 Semovente 75 SP Guns

2 Enemy Asslt River Craft

Quantities of small arms and SAA.

Attachments.
Tps Battle Reports.
"I" Report
Sitreps
Codes and Places

R.W.Sankey,
Lieut Colonel, R.M.
Cdg 40 R.M. Commando

APPENDIX A2

SITREP.

110530B	Sitrep first light. Going to asslt now. Challenged by sentry at STROUD. Otherwise NTR.
110915B	At 0910 hrs tk with enemy tps arrived at STRANGE taking approx 15 our men PW.
111000B	STROUD captured 0945 hrs but unable to reach STRANGE which still intact.
111615B	Siterep 1600 hrs. Strong opposition sniping and mortars delayed capture of STROUD until 0945 hrs. 33 PW. STRANGE reached 0830 hrs after hy casualties from mortaring and sniping but enemy tk and inf captured our tps 0900 hrs. Own casualties approx 90 Bn Queens crossed STRANGE 1030 hrs. Hy shelling and mortaring areas STEWARD STRANGE SHOWELL intermittent all day. Now exploiting TAYLOR occupying STROUD. Tonights intentions -----.
120630B	Sitrep first light. STRANGE shelled 1700-1930 hrs and A tk gun fired on ARGINE DURANA from 405590 1930-2002 hrs. 10 cas suffered on minefields on TAYLOR last night. Patrol contacted QUEENS approx 410597 0400 hrs. German tk fully serviceable captured yesterday STROUD now receiving German sigs on WT set. Report follows.
121000B	Tk reported in first light sitrep is SEMOVENTE 75/34. Enemy handset found STROUD 1000 hrs has following words on cover Quote Leopold PBH. Gesangwerein I 9. Patriarch N A Diogenes 2 N A Unquote.

J.G.Matters,
Lieut, R.M.
I.O. 40 R.M. Commando

OPERATION "IMPACT"
CODEWORDS.

SHAW	House	421583
SHIPTON	X rds and canal junc	416586
SHOWELL	rd and track juncs	43155895
STEWARD	bend in rd	423599
STRANGE	xing rd and canal	421595
STROUD	Pumping Station	423607
TAYLOR	Strada dell PIOPPA	395598
TOLLEMACHE	Scolo Menate	4057
USHERS	F RENO	----

BATTLE REPORT OF "A" TROOP
11/12 Apr 45.

Set off from SAN ALBERTO	2000 hrs
Arrived FUP	2300 hrs
Arrived at the first gap in the dyke	0145 hrs
Tp arrived behind Tac HQ	0500 hrs
Throughout the forenoon the Tp was under Spandau fire, airburst, Mortar, shellfire - from SP or arty, snipers.
Moved up to second gap in dyke	1400 hrs
Complete Tp was across the gap by	1445 hrs
Tp arrived at STRANGE at	1615 hrs
Arrived at "X" Tp posn approx 250 yds from "Cdo" br	1700 hrs
Capts Belbin and Pook to HQ	1945 hrs
Cries for help were heard	2115 hrs
Capts Belbin and Pook were found wounded in mined area	2215 hrs
Stretcher parties were working until	0430 hrs
Arrived back in TAYLOR at	0450 hrs
Laid up on bank till	1600 hrs
Arrived CASA BANZI, MENATE area	1730 hrs

These timing are approx.

W.E.Seales,
Lieut R.M.
15 Apr 45

Battle Report of "P" Troop.
11/12 Apr 45.

At 0500 hours the advance halted and a runner reported that "Y" troop had been challenged approaching the river. Major Porter called Lieut Pegrum and myself forward and impressed on us how important it was that the river be crossed. "Y" Tp would provide covering fire whilst "P" Tp with the attached "Q" Tp patrol would storm the river wading across. Lieut Pegrum and myself returned to our Secs. No 4 Sec was on the lake side of the dyke and to join with Major Porter, it was necessary to cross over. Rifle and MG fire was by this time coming down the dyke.

Major Porter, Lieut Wedgewood with 3 Sec and Tp HQ proceeded down the benk towards the bridge, at the "blow" Lt Wedgewood attempted to cross the river, but found it was too deep.

The blow was then crossed and using the river bank as line of approach to the bridge, advanced. It was now becoming quite light.

Twelve Germans were seen crossing the bridge from the South side making for the buildings. Bren and rifle fire was brought to bear and casualties inflicted. The Germans in the Farm house North of the river returned fire. The advance towards the bridge continued using the river bark as cover. Bren Gps were detailed off to cover the building North of the river, riflemen firing on the North side of the bridge to stop any Germans from blowing it. Lt Wedgewood was wounded but carried on. Further fire came from the buildings on the south side of the bank into the rear of the SpGps. The Aslt Gp under L/Cpl Vickers was to carry the bridge. Major Porter and Lt Wedgewood stayed with the Sp Gp endeavouring to keep the enemy in both buildings down. Lt Wedgewood, although wounded again, continued firing his pistol. One by one the Sp Cp in an exposed position from the rear was picked off. Also Sgt Hill's party 20 yards from the "blow" received casualties. The bank was completely covered by fire from the posns South of the bridge and the farm buildings, and any movement was fatal. The "blow" itself was covered with MG fire. The Aslt party proceeded to the Assaulting position. On a given word they began to assault. Small arms fire from the West side of the bridge wounded L/Cpl Vickers. A message was shouted back that it was impossible to cross the bridge which afforded little or no cover. About this time Major Porter was killed and shortly afterwards Lieut Wedgewood was shot through the head, after being wounded three times. Th Germans began to counter-attack to blow the bridge, the demolition wires having apparently been cut with Bren fire from Mne Punton who was firing into the bridge. What remained of the men kept firing on to the bridge until there was no ammunition left. Cl/Sgt Harvey attempted to withdraw, but enemy fire made it impossible and he too with Sgt Scott were killed. The remaining men of the Tp were picked off by small arms fire and Mnes Harwood and Mullins were taken prisoner. The Germans informed them that several Mnes had already been taken prisoners. About this time "Fantails" appeared and the Germans panicked. Harwood and Mullins picked up rifles and demanded their surrender. One German attempted to use a MG but was prevented from doing so.

No 4 Sec began moving over the dyke leaving the West side and began to move forward to the river bank to join Major Porter. "Y" Tp Mnes said that the remainder of "P" Tp had dashed down the bank towards the bridge.

It was becoming light and about this time heavy shelling commenced. A direct hit on the rear of the Sec resulted in the death of Cpl Woodall and L/Cpl Sutcliffe and wounding two other Mnes. Cpl Corcoran and Mne Moody were sniped and I ordered the sec to dig in as it was impossible to move. Fire was now coming down from the direction of the bridge and the slightest movement brought down accurate fire. In the lulls there was a certain amount of duelling took place on the bank with grenades and 2" Mortar. Two more Mnes were wounded by Small arms fire.

Later in the morning a tank approached the Pumping Station and disappeared in the buildings.

At a time not known, aircraft attacked the house and "Y" Tp began to withdraw. I ordered 4 Sec to do the same and what remained of the sec withdrew behind the dyke.

Later in the morning Mnes Burrows, Harwood and Millins returned from Tp HQ and No 3 Sec.

In the afternoon during the mortaring of the dyke, Mnes Day and Millins were wounded and evacuated.

W.W.Sandford, Lieut R.M.

Battle Report of "Q" Troop.
11/12 Apr 45.

At 2000 hours 10 Apr 45, Two stand patrols of 1 officer and 14 ORs and 1 Sgt and 7 Mnes moved with P Tp from the forming up area at 494556. Remainder of Tp moved off from forming up area at 494556. Patrols arrived at Rice Factory at 2115 hours. Remainder of Tp, the boating party arrived at Rice Factory at 2130 hours.

Boating party moved off in the Aslt boats alongside of the dyke arriving at the gap at approx 0215 hours, when "Y" Tp was ferried across immediately to cover the advance of the remainder of the Cdo. Boating party remained at the gap until S and A Tps came up to be ferried across.

By 0400 hours the complete unit was across the gap and boating party proceeded up to carry out its intention of ferrying troops across the canal.

At 0520 hours the battle had commenced before the boating party could reach the canal, due to mud and weed in the lake. Boating party came under shell fire at 435598 and took cover on seaward side of the dyke, where message was received that canal could be negotiated without assistance of the boats.

The Boating party assumed role of being in reserve at 0545 hours and took up defensive posn at 433597. At 1330 hours the party received orders to come up to join Tp HQ and the patrols at 426603 and the Tp as a whole took up defensive posns on seward side of the main dyke 100 yards North of Tac HQ.

Patrols moved off from left side of dyke to right side at 0530 hours and were heavily shelled and sniped sustaining 7 casualties. They withdrew under intermittent shell fire and accurate SA fire at 0545 hours, to Tac HQ sustaining a further 6 casualties.

At 1730 hours Q Tp, as a whole occupied the Power House which had been cleared of the enemy before by X Tp, established standing patrols on the dyke at 424608 and at the head of the rd at 423607 and protected the right flank. This was completed by 1830 hours.

At 1815 hours 150 civilians arrived to take shelter in Power station. At 1915 hours the Standing patrols were withdrawn.

At 1930 hours Q Tp withdrew with the Cdo to rest area.

F.H.Bristowe,
Captain, RM.
13 Apr 45

Battle Report of X Tp.
11/12 Apr 45.

On the evening of 10 Apr, 'X' Tp moved into the forming up area with a strength of 2 officers, 1 WO, 4 Sgts, 6 Cpls and 40 Mnes.

'X' Tp moved up the dyke in the rear of a section of 'Q' Tp attached to 'P' Tp.

On reaching area 426604 at 0630 hours the Tp came under heavy fire and went to ground on the lake side of the dyke. Movement was made almost impossible by two snipers, one in the house at 423607 and the other in house at 421598. The sniper in the house at 423607 was engaged with Bren fire with ineffective results.

At approx 0930 hours four Spitfires bombed and machine gunned the area of the house and pumping station at 423607. Under cover of this the Tp crossed the canal at 425604 with the aid of toggle ropes. Capt Belbin crossed first with the rope and secured it to the far bank. The canal was about 3 ft deep and the bottom was thick mud which made the crossing difficult.

Assault parties immediately moved up the dyke and captured the objective at approx 1000 hours. 3 officers and 16 ORs were taken prisoner. 1 German was seen to retreat northwards up the dyke.

Enemy documents, 1 SP gun Italian type and quantity of small arms were captured.

The position came under sporadic small arms fire from house at 421596. At 1146 hours Own troops were soon in area. A patrol of 1 NCO and 4 Mnes was sent off at 1200 hours to contact the troops in the houses. On arrival the patrol found the house in enemy hands, but being surprised from the flank, the Germans surrendered. Fourteen prisoners were taken. The area came under heavy shell fire and the patrol was unable to return.

At 1300 hours approx, on orders from the CO, the troop moved up and exploited road running West from Cdo Bridge.

A platoon of the Queens was already in position at 416597. The Tp dug in around house and road and track junction.

At 1645 hours, a 2 pdr Little John moved up in the area of the house and was knocked out by a SP gun firing from approx 1,000 yards away. This gun opened up again at 1800 hours and hit the house, causing one casualty, Cpl Leyshon, who remained at duty until ordered by the MO to proceed to hospital the next morning.

At 2100 hours on Stand Down, Mne Waylen was hit by burst of TSMG fire from unknown firer.

At approx 2100 hours, message was received on WT from 'Q' Tp that the 2 IC wanted to see Capt Belbin and Capt Pook at 'Q' Tp location straight away. It appears that the party crossed the bridge and turned down track 422596 and set off a mine, on attracting attention and being carried back, one of the stretcher party set of another mine. Csualtios fror this, in the Tp were, Capt Belbin, and Mne Smith R. wounded. Cpl Pitt died of wounds.

BATTLE REPORT OF "Y" TROOP.
11/12 Apr 45.

"Y" Tp formed up on the dyke in readiness to precede the Cdo as Advance Guard moved off along the dyke at about 102330 hours.

There were no difficulties at first and the gap in the bank dyke 55592 was reached at approx 110130 hrs. Word was passed back to that effect and a position was taken up to cover the Bren Sec under Lt Atkinson. The gap was too muddy and Capt Thomson asked for the asslt boats to come up. These came up on the right and the Tp started to cross the gap and formed up on the right of the bank.

A few minutes later a mine exploded. This seemed to throw the boat sec into some confusion and Lt Parker went forward to see what had happened. Capt Thomson had been brought back across the gap and was lying on the bank, wounded. He said that he could not go on and that Lt Parker would have to take over the Tp. Lt Parker went forward across the gap and found that the entire Bren Sec including Lt Atkinson wore lying wounded about 50 yds across on the bank. They were told to wait there and the Sappers started prodding a path towards them and the Sick Bay attendant and stretchers were sent for. Tp was re-organised and the front Bren Gunners replaced.

In order to ferry the Cdo over the gap, all the asslt boats were joined in the manner of a pontoon bridge. The sappers were told to advance past the casualties and continue their lane along the top of the bank. This they did but reported heavy mining which they did not think they could cross before daylight. They were ordered to press on as fast as possible and the Sgt Major was told to take the Tp across the gap. This was reported back to the CO. Sappers said that they were meeting heavy mining still and they were told to cut the trip wires only. They did this and after a time came to a small wire fence which they crossed. The Tp was moved on as fast as possible and again this was reported back by runner.

The Tp approached the dyke and the Bren Sec was challenged by an enemy sentry on the far side of the dyke. Sgt Cooper immediately moved his Bren guns into position to cover the Tp. This was investigated and "Y" Tp took up a position on the bank.

Major Porter came up and it was decided that "Y" Tp would move over on the left handside of the dyke and move into posn there. Major Porter said that he would come up on the left. "Y" Tp moved forward and came under fire and rushed the bank and got into posn to cover Major Porter, who came up with one sec. Major Porter and Lt Parker then recced the dyke and it was decided for "P" Tp to try and cross with covering fire from "Y" Tp. Major Porter then moved off to the left. Hy fire was exchanged with the enemy and in turn the Cdo came under hy enemy small arms, mortar and shell fire, sustaining casualties and having the Tp wireless set temporarily knocked out. Grenades were exchanged across the bank and EY air bursts and 2" Mortar fire was put down.

"P" Tp were moving up to the br by fire and mov and there was quite a lot of fire from their direction. They were given Bren gun fire across on to the house on the opposite side of the river to their posn. The enemy were getting into their stride with their snipers by this time and more casualties were sustained, but they could not be reached or evacuated, even with the aid of counter Bren fire and 2" mor smoke, owing to the heaviness and accuracy of the enemy fire. Communication was established and a Medical orderly and Red X flag were asked for. Pte Calder came up and walking along the bank under fire spoke to the German NCO across the bank telling him not to shoot and then started to evacuate casualties. The stretcher party was fired on, Cpl Wickstead being hit in the shoulder. The wireless set was again hit and put out of commission. "P" Tp were out on the left and fire was still hy. The posn was held in order to cover "P Tp.

A little later on a tk moved up to the br and after a short but hy Fire Fight, about 8 to 10 Mnes were taken prisoner. The PLAT had been knocked out so the tk was unable to be engaged. The tk noved to the Power House. The enemy then moved up 2 MG 42s on the Tp's left flank which was completely exposed. It was decided to move over to the opposite side of the bank to obtain more cover.

Sgt Cooper was ordered to get a Bren gun in posn and cover the Tp over the bank. This he did being wounded on the way but carrying on to engage the eremy sniper and spandau at close quarters with his Tommy gun.

The aircraft went into the attack at the same time, The Tp moved to the Right side of the bank - "X" Tp were then moving in to the asslt. "Y" Pp was halted with the intention of giving "X" Tp covering fire, but the CO ordered the Tp back behind his HQ and to dig in and re-organise.

"Y" Tp then became casualty clearing sce and HQ def "P" Tp. A party went to "P" Tp with two boats and after fetching in one load found fire far too heavy to continue.

This posn was occupied until the move back to MENATE.

B.Parker,
Lieut, R.M.
15 Apr 45

Battle Report of "S" Troop.
11/12 Apr 45.

The Tp moved up to Cdo FUP by march route arriving there at approx 2200 hours. The weapon stores were brought up on a 3 ton lorry.

Difficulty was experienced on getting stores loaded on a stormboat, this delayed the Tp considerably. It was then found that the stormboat could not navigate the channel from the URMANA Pump house to the lake. The boat as lightened and the TP finally moved off from the FUP at 0045 hours. Slight shelling of the area was in progress during this time.

The main body of the Cdo was eventually contacted at about 0230 hours about 500 yards short of the gap in the Floodwall. There was considerable delay here and as "S" Tp was last Tp to be ferried across the gap the rest of the Cdo had pushed a long way ahead.

The Tp continued past the Gap, but at 450594 the boat became stuck in the mud and could not be moved on. By this time it was after First light and the dyke came under heavy shell fire.

We dug in in this posn and at 0730 hours I moved forward to contact the CO at Tac HQ. I arrived at A Tp posn and found that movement beyond was very difficult owing to sniping, I contacted HQ by A Tp 18 set and was instructed to remain in my posn.

At about 1400 hours a party from the Tp was supplied as stretcher bearers. Two other parties were supplied and several casualties were evacuated from the forward posns to the stretcher Jeep at the gap.

At 1100 hours on 12 Apr the Tp moved forward to support "Q" holding the posn at Stroud 423608. MMG taking up posn at 423603 with DF taken along the ARGINE. Mortars at 427602 with similar DF tasks.

G.M.Russell,
Lieut, R.M.
O.C. "S" Troop

"I" REPORT

Ref Map:- ITALY 1:50,000 Sheet 89-IV ALFONSINE.

101900B	Cdo moved off from Start Pt 525528 by March Route.
102100B	" at FUP - UMANA Pump House 494556. Loaded asslt boats.
102330B	" moved off along ARGINE DI BURANA 493556; order of march - "Y", "P", "X", Tac HQ, Main HQ, "A", "S" and "Q" loading and manning boats.
110130B	Cdo halted by breach in ARGINE 455592, commenced crossing by asslt boat raft, leading Tp with att RE gp encounter minefield, sustaining 9 casualties.
110230B	Cdo RE Gp cleared path through minefield, lifting 150 mines.
110300B	Cdo passing through cleared path.
110530B	Leading Tp reached end of ARGINE 426604, where challenged by enemy at opposite bank of MENATE Canal.
110535B	Short fire fight at canal mouth, as "Y" Tp try to cover movement of "X" to cross canal and "P" Tp to br 421596. Cdo now lying along both banks of ARGINE from 426604 - 428597 and first light making observation possible.
110555B	Enemy arty cone is sea area 430605 - air bursts.
110600/0620B	Light rifle fire from br and MENATE Pump House 423607.
110630B	Fwd tps engage Pump House and FDLs with 2" and Bren.
110635/0820B	ARGINE subjected to hy and accurate mortaring from Soth and Cdo suffered hy cas, owing to difficulty of diffing in in water-logged sides of ARGINE. Meanwhile accurate sniping from enemy inflicted many casualties on tps on NORTH side of ARGINE. "X" and "Y" Tps engaging enemy across Canal, as "P" Tp approach br along EAST bank of MENATE Canal.
110825B	Own 25 pounder arty engaging enemy posns 42105910 - 41735932.
110830/0855B	Again mortared heavily and accurate sniping from Pump House, while enemy in posns around br engage "P" Tp and ARGINE with Spandaus and SA fire.
110900B	Enemy SEMOVENTE SP 75 mm Gun followed by enemy inf appeared on br, "P" Tp all appeared to be casualties, and German Medical orderlies seen hurrying across br down to canal bank with many Red X flags. Shortly afterwards about a dozen of "P" Tp and att REs seen being marched away by enemy, their hands above their heads, disappearing over rd at WEST end of br.
110920B/0945B	Spitfires bombed and straffed Pump house, while "X" Tp wade through canal holding rope.
111000B	"X" Tp attack and capture Pump House, taking 23 PW and the SEMOVENTE 75 intact, finding many civs taking refuge there. Killed approx 5 enemy.
111030B	Inf from Bn Queens approaching br, covered by hy Bren, SA and 2" mortar fire from remainder of Cdo still in posn on NORTH bank of ARGINE.
111100B	ARGINE and area 4358 shelled from SW.
111119/1145B	Enemy 88 mm shelling area 4260.
111155/1205B	Enemy 88 mm shelling ARGINE 425595, while own arty firing smoke markers on our posn. Casualties suffered from former only.
111220B	Agrine 425595 again shelled.
111235/0240B	Br shelled by enemy, some near misses.
111330B	"X" Tp exploit along Str PIOPPA for 500 yds to approx 412597, no contact with enemy.
111600B	"Q" Tp occupy Pump House area, taking up all-round def posn.
111700B 1716B 1720B 1850B 1930B	Enemy shelling br area and area 4359 without effect.
111835B	CO to O Gb with Brig 169 Bde at 427586. "X" Tp join up with "A" Tp.
111930B	A Tk gun from 405590 firing low over ARGINE, bursting in VALLE DEL COMMACHIO. Remnant "P", "Y" and "S" Tp dug in in ARGINE.
120445B	"A" Tp report that OCs "A" and "X" Tps and 10 ORs mine casualties area 423597 late last night on way to O Gp at Pump House, evac by Army Medical personnel. (it appears from map ref that they had either lost their way , or were searching for "P" Tp cas)
120805B	Cdo HQ from ARGINE to Pump House.
121600B	"S" Tp manning ARGINE, "Q" Tp def Pump House area, "A", "X", "P/Y" MENATE as Bde flank protection and counter-attack gp. Pump House area shelled by 210 mm gun from NW - no cas.
131500B	Cdo Burial service at ADS cemetery il Belvedere 427586.
131800B	Cdo conc for return to RAVENNA.
131945B	Cdo left by veh convoy for RAVENNA.
140200B	Cdo est PORT CORSINI in billets.

Note:- On all occasions when enemy arty fire was conc in Cdo area, att FOOs called for fire by W.T.

J.G.Matters,
Lieut, R.M.
I.O. 40 R.M. Commando.

FIRE PLAN AT CALL FOR 40 ROYAL MARINE COMMANDO.

SALT	4166 5868	Stonk axis 360 degrees
PEPPER	4041 6000	CONC
VINEGAR	4301 5897	CONC
MUSTARD	4235 5998	CONC One Tp.

OBOE	Smoke screen at call
PICKLE	422 590	Bearing 305 degrees. 4 pts of origin 200 yds

	D.F.'s.
ROSE	4258 5952	- 4220 5913
PAM	4210 5910	- 4173 5932
MARY		4173 5979
JUNE		4173 6022
SHEILA		4173 6070
VERA		4173 6117
SUSAN		416 616
BETTY		408 610

: Next page: May

: Previous page: March

: Previous article in the series '40 Commando': 40 Commando 1944

RM CDOS 40 Commando 1945

Select page

Select article

April

Comments

Table of contents

Series table of contents

Article information

More in War Diaries

More from Craig Robertson

Share this article page